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ABSTRACT 
  Facebook, Google, and other leading technology companies in 
Silicon Valley have been buying start-up companies at a brisk pace. In 
many of these transactions, the buyer has little interest in acquiring the 
startup’s projects or assets. Instead, the buyer’s primary motivation is 
to hire some or all of the startup’s software engineers. These so-called 
“acqui-hires” represent a novel—and increasingly common—tool by 
which the largest and most successful technology companies in the 
world satisfy their intense demand for engineering talent. 
  To date, the acqui-hire has attracted no attention in the academic 
or professional legal literature. With this Article, we aspire to fill this 
gap. Drawing on interviews with Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, venture 
capitalists, buyer representatives, and transactional lawyers, we offer 
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the first formal description of the acqui-hire. In so doing, we seek to 
enrich the understanding of those already acquainted with the acqui-
hire while also providing a comprehensive account of this transaction 
structure to the uninitiated. 
  We also discuss an existential puzzle: Why do acqui-hires occur? If 
a large technology company wants to hire a team of software 
engineers, why does it go to all of the trouble and expense of 
acquiring the company that currently employs them? Why not simply 
hire away the individuals that it wants? We argue that the solution to 
the puzzle lies primarily in the way that social norms and the threat of 
informal sanctions shape the behavior of members of the Silicon 
Valley technology community. Although California law generally 
allows for easy employee mobility, social norms lead many 
companies to engage in acqui-hires. We buttress this norms-based 
explanation with insights from prospect theory and tax law to show 
that the unique structure of acqui-hires reduces their perceived and 
actual costs, which in turn also promotes these transactions. 
  We then consider the most significant negotiation issue in acqui-
hires: how the buyer’s aggregate purchase price will be allocated 
between the startup’s software engineers and its outside investors. 
Although our interviews suggested that there is currently no 
established norm for making this allocation, we predict that a money-
back-for-the-investors norm will eventually develop to drive 
allocation determinations. We then propose several contractual 
innovations that could be designed to try to augment the investors’ 
share of acqui-hiring proceeds. 
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“[A] lot of the acquisitions that we make at Facebook are, you know, 
we look at great entrepreneurs out there who are building things. And 
often, the acquisitions aren’t even to really buy their company or what 
they’re doing. It’s to get the really talented people who are out there 
trying to build something cool and say, you know, if you joined 
Facebook, you could work on this completely different problem. Isn’t 
this a more important problem? And for the people who answer that 
question yes, they join. And that’s how we’ve had the most success so 
far.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Facebook, Google, and other leading technology companies in 
Silicon Valley have been buying start-up companies at a brisk pace.2 
In many of these transactions, the buyer has little interest in acquiring 
the startup’s projects or assets. Instead, the buyer’s primary 
motivation is to hire some or all of the startup’s software engineers. 
After the transaction, the buyer redeploys the newly hired talent onto 
 
 1. Interview by Charlie Rose with Mark Zuckerberg, Founder, Facebook, and Sheryl 
Sandberg, COO, Facebook, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Nov. 7, 2011), available at http:// techcrunch.
 com/2011/11/07/zuckerberg-talks-to-charlie-rose-about-war-ipos-and-googles-little-version-of-
facebook. 
 2. See Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 75–76 (Jan. 29, 2013), available at 
https://investor.google.com/pdf/20121231_google_10K.pdf (noting fifty-three total acquisitions 
for the fiscal year that ended on December 31, 2012); PRIVCO MEDIA LLC, FACEBOOK, INC. 
PRIVATE COMPANY FINANCIAL REPORT 37–38 (2012) (noting eleven total acquisitions for the 
fiscal year that ended on December 31, 2011); see also Shayndi Raice, New Tech Spenders in 
Feeding Frenzy, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2012, at B1 (describing accelerating acquisition activity by 
Silicon Valley buyers in 2012). 
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its existing projects and jettisons the startup’s projects.3 These 
acquisitions are known in the tech world as “acqui-hires.”4 
Given the pervasiveness of acqui-hiring and the prominence of 
the companies that engage in it, it is not surprising that acqui-hiring is 
frequently discussed on blogs and other websites.5 Nor is it surprising 
that it has recently come to the attention of the mainstream media.6 
What is surprising is that, to date, the acqui-hiring phenomenon has 
attracted no attention in the academic or professional legal literature.7 
This neglect is particularly striking because acqui-hiring represents a 
novel—and increasingly common—tool by which the most successful 
technology companies satisfy their intense demand for engineering 
talent. It is also noteworthy because acqui-hiring raises a host of 
interesting issues across a wide range of topics that are relevant to 
lawyers and legal academics, including employment law, corporate 
law, intellectual property law, tax law, social norms, and behavioral 
economics. 
 
 3. See Miguel Helft, For Buyers of Web Start-Ups, Quest To Corral Young Talent, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A1 (“Companies like Facebook, Google and Zynga are so hungry for 
the best talent that they are buying start-ups to get their founders and engineers—and then 
jettisoning their products.”). 
 4. Some commentators refer to this phenomenon as an “acqhire” or a “talent 
acquisition.” Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Michael Arrington, Some Investors May Request Protection from Acqui-hires, 
UNCRUNCHED (Apr. 24, 2012), http://uncrunched.com/2012/04/24/some-investors-may-request-
protection-from-aqui-hires; Nate C. Hindman, The Top 15 Tech ‘Acqui-Hires,’ HUFFPOST TECH 
(May 7, 2011, 11:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/29/acqui-hires_n_867865.html
#s283726&title=Facebook__Dropio; Patricio Robles, Is the Acquihire Really a Smart Strategy?, 
ECONSULTANCY (Oct. 28, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://econsultancy.com/us/blog/8201-is-the-
acquihire-really-a-smart-strategy. 
 6. See, e.g., Dan Bobkoff, Employee Shopping: ‘Acqui-Hire’ Is the New Normal in Silicon 
Valley, NPR (Sept. 24, 2012, 3:23 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/
2012/09/25/161573307/employee-shopping-acqui-hire-is-the-new-normal-in-silicon-valley (“Tech 
companies like Google, Facebook and Zynga are on a shopping spree. They’re buying small 
startups with innovative products and apps. But, many times, the tech giants don’t care about 
what the small companies were producing. They just want the engineers.”); Sarah E. 
Needleman, Start-Ups Get Snapped up for Their Talent, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2012, at B6 
(“Established technology companies increasingly are buying—and then shutting down—early 
stage start-ups, mostly to acquire their software-engineering talent. Investors, attorneys and 
others involved have dubbed these transactions acqui-hires.”). 
 7. A recent search for the term “acqui-hiring” (and several variations in spelling) in law 
reviews, bar journals, and other legal periodicals on Lexis and Westlaw generated only two hits. 
One was a reprint of the New York Times article cited above, which briefly described the 
phenomenon. See supra note 3. The other was an article coauthored by one of us, see Gregg D. 
Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantage of Founders’ Stock, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1085 (2012), which briefly and preliminarily addressed the tax implications of acqui-hiring, see 
id. at 1097–99. These tax implications are explored in greater depth in Part III.F. 
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With this Article, we aspire to fill this gap in the literature. Based 
on in-depth interviews with individuals who have firsthand knowledge 
of acqui-hires—including entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, angel 
investors, buyer representatives, and transactional lawyers—we 
describe the acqui-hire transaction structure in detail.8 In so doing, we 
offer the first formal account of a novel transaction structure that is 
familiar to a relatively confined group of people in Silicon Valley but 
largely unknown to everyone else. 
We also identify—and seek to solve—a puzzle regarding the 
acqui-hiring phenomenon. If a large technology company wants to 
hire a team of software engineers, why go to all of the trouble and 
expense of acquiring the company that currently employs them? Why 
not simply hire away the individuals it wants? The latter approach 
would be less costly because it would not require that any money be 
paid to the startup’s outside investors. The question is all the more 
perplexing because legal rules do not explain why companies would 
prefer an acqui-hire over simply hiring the targeted employees. 
California law generally provides for easy employee mobility; for 
example, the ability to enforce covenants not to compete is strictly 
limited.9 Given the pro-employee-mobility orientation of California 
law, the litigation risk stemming from poaching employees will often 
be minimal. The puzzle, therefore, is why a large technology company 
would engage in an acqui-hire to meet its hiring needs when there 
 
 8. We interviewed seventeen individuals based in Silicon Valley during the spring of 2012. 
Each interviewee had firsthand knowledge of at least one acqui-hire, and many had been 
involved in multiple acqui-hires. Six interviews were conducted in person during a research trip 
to Silicon Valley in May 2012. Nine interviews were conducted over the phone. The remaining 
two interviews took place over e-mail, as the interviewees responded in writing to written 
questions and follow-up questions. We arranged the interviews by asking friends and colleagues 
to make introductions on our behalf. Accordingly, the responses that we received may reflect a 
bias stemming from this nonrandom sample. The answers that we received were, however, 
consistent with observations and sentiments voiced by bloggers and message-board commenters 
at websites that regularly discuss acqui-hiring. After a draft of this Article was posted to the 
Social Science Research Network in August 2012, it received significant positive attention from 
Silicon Valley insiders, which suggests that our sample of interviewees was representative. See, 
e.g., Michael Arrington, The Lawyers Look at the Aqui-hires, UNCRUNCHED (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://uncrunched.com/2012/08/10/the-lawyers-look-at-the-aqui-hires (“What’s most interesting 
about the paper for me – these guys, outsiders, really get the whole psychology of Silicon Valley 
and the multi-stage game that’s going on.”); Dan Primack, Attack of the Acqui-hires, 
CNNMONEY (Aug. 10, 2012, 10:28 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/08/10/attack-of-
the-acqui-hires (“You’ve almost certainly heard of acqui-hires, and now UNC law professors 
John Coyle and Gregg Polsky have written what seems to be the first academic paper on the 
subject.”). 
 9. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
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would seem to be a ready alternative that is less expensive and less 
complicated. Or, more succinctly, why do acqui-hires ever occur? 
The solution to this puzzle, we argue, lies primarily in the ability 
of social norms to influence the behavior of members of the Silicon 
Valley technology community.10 Although California law allows for 
easy employee mobility,11 our interviews suggest that software 
engineers will in many cases prefer an acqui-hire over a simple 
defection because they do not want to risk incurring informal 
sanctions.12 In addition, an acqui-hire allows the engineers to claim 
that their venture resulted in a successful exit, which has significant 
cultural cachet in Silicon Valley. An acqui-hire may also generate 
modest reputational benefits for the buyer or its representatives and 
make it easier for the buyer to differentiate the pay packages of 
similarly situated engineers. Finally, acqui-hiring is supported by the 
nonadversarial culture of Silicon Valley and its legal community. We 
argue, in short, that the explanation for the acqui-hiring phenomenon 
is based on the unique social structure and community norms of 
Silicon Valley, resulting in a triumph of social norms over legal rights 
and duties. 
In addition, to fully explain the acqui-hiring phenomenon, we 
believe it is necessary to supplement this norms-based account with 
two additional insights. First, we draw upon the behavioral-economic 
literature to argue that the structure of the acqui-hire reduces the 
perceived cost to the engineers of engaging in an acqui-hire in lieu of 
simply defecting. In an acqui-hire, a portion of the engineer’s 
compensation is deflected, in effect, to other stakeholders in the 
startup. Behavioral-economic theory suggests that the perceived cost 
of this deflection will be less than if the engineer had actually received 
the compensation and then paid it over to these other stakeholders. 
Second, we believe that tax considerations often reduce the actual 
 
 10. In this Article, we use the terms “entrepreneur” or “founder” to refer to those 
individuals who founded a start-up company. We use the term “engineer” to refer to software 
engineers or programmers who design and develop computer programs. We use the term 
“employee” to refer to any individual who works at the startup at the time it is acqui-hired. In 
many cases, the terms overlap. For example, a founder is also an employee of the startup and is 
very often also an engineer. In discussing the dynamics of an acqui-hire, we sometimes use the 
terms “entrepreneur” and “engineer” interchangeably because, first, they often overlap, and, 
second, even when the terms do not overlap, both groups would generally need to consent to 
the acqui-hire for the deal to be consummated. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. The arguments and conclusions developed in this Article are restricted to acqui-hires of 
start-up companies in Silicon Valley by technology companies based in California. 
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cost of engaging in an acqui-hire by transforming ordinary income 
into capital gains. 
Having solved the puzzle of why acqui-hires occur, we then 
consider the most significant negotiation issue in acqui-hires: how the 
buyer’s aggregate purchase price will be allocated between the 
startup’s engineers and its outside investors. We predict that a 
money-back-for-the-investors norm is likely to develop and that this 
norm will drive allocation determinations in acqui-hire transactions. 
We then propose and analyze several contractual innovations that 
could be used to try to augment the investors’ shares of acqui-hiring 
proceeds. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I describes the acqui-
hire structure and identifies the puzzle that it presents. Part II 
considers—and then rejects—the argument that acqui-hiring is driven 
by a desire on the part of the participants to reduce litigation risk. 
Part III provides a comprehensive theory of acqui-hiring that 
emphasizes the impact of social norms on participants’ 
decisionmaking. Part IV takes up the critical issue of how proceeds of 
acqui-hire transactions are shared between engineers and investors. 
I.  THE ACQUI-HIRING PHENOMENON 
In this Part we describe the acqui-hiring transaction structure 
that has become commonplace in Silicon Valley in recent years. We 
first explain the typical investment structure of startups in Silicon 
Valley and then discuss the challenges that large technology 
companies currently face in satisfying their intense demand for 
engineering talent. In response to these challenges, technology 
companies have turned to acqui-hires, the mechanics of which are 
described in detail. We conclude this Part by identifying the 
existential puzzle presented by the acqui-hiring phenomenon. 
A. Investment Structure in Silicon Valley Startups 
To finance a start-up company, entrepreneurs typically sell 
equity in the company to outside investors. Most investment capital 
provided to new ventures comes from one of two sources: (1) 
venture-capital funds (VCs), which raise and pool money from 
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investors to invest in early-stage companies;13 and (2) wealthy 
individuals known as angel investors, who invest directly in early-
stage companies.14 In addition, business incubators sometimes provide 
wide-ranging advice and support to early-stage companies in 
exchange for a small equity stake.15 
Investment in startups is typically made in a series of rounds. At 
the very early stages of a company’s development, there will be a seed 
round in which the company raises capital to launch the enterprise. 
The amount of cash raised in a seed round involving a technology 
company can vary, though a typical seed round involving professional 
investors will raise in the vicinity of $1 million.16 If the company shows 
promise, then it may raise additional funds from investors in 
subsequent rounds of financing. These subsequent rounds are known 
as Series A rounds, Series B rounds, Series C rounds, and so on.17 
 
 13. See generally Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture 
Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 48–54 (discussing 
venture-capital firms). 
 14. See generally Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital, in VENTURE 
CAPITAL: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 71 (Douglas J. Cumming 
ed., 2010) (discussing angel investors). 
 15. See Darek Klonowski, Business Incubation and Its Connection to Venture Capital, in 
VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 111, 113 (“Business incubators are places where low-cost, 
real estate-based facilities are provided to nurture the development of new firms.”). The best-
known business incubator in Silicon Valley is Y Combinator, which began operations in 2005 
and currently provides seed funding (in cash and services) to eighty-two startups each year in 
exchange for small stakes in the companies. Parmy Olson, Who Needs Silicon Valley?, FORBES, 
Aug. 22, 2011, at 64, 65. Although Y Combinator itself invests only a relatively small amount in 
each startup—the average is $18,000, see Austin Carr, Paul Graham: Why Y Combinator 
Replaces the Traditional Corporation, FAST CO. (Feb. 22, 2012, 12:25 AM), http://www.
fastcompany.com/1818523/paul-graham-why-y-combinator-replaces-traditional-corporation—
certain angel investors have pledged to invest $150,000 in any company that Y Combinator 
accepts into its program. Id. When companies funded by Y Combinator are sold, a significant 
number of these sales take the form of acqui-hires. See Miguel Helft, Are Talent Acquisitions a 
Sign of a New Bubble?, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (May 18, 2011, 2:46 PM), bits.blogs.nytimes.
com/2011/05/18/are-talent-acquisitions-a-sign-of-a-new-bubble (“Of the more than 310 start-ups 
that have passed through [Y Combinator], a mere 25 have been sold and about 18 of those were 
talent acquisitions.”). 
 16. See Barry J. Kramer & Steven S. Levin, 2012 Seed Financing Survey: Internet/Digital 
Media and Software Industries, FENWICK & WEST LLP 2, 7 (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.fenwick.
com/FenwickDocuments/2012_Seed_Survey_Report.pdf (finding median amounts raised in its 
sample of Internet or digital media and software companies to be $1.36 million for preferred-
stock investments and $918,000 for convertible-note investments in 2012, with similar medians 
for 2010 and 2011). 
 17. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 
1739–40 (1994) (discussing rounds of financing). 
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Founders and employees of a startup generally receive common 
stock (or options to purchase common stock) in the company in 
exchange for their contribution of services to the organization.18 VC 
investors in a startup will, by contrast, typically receive convertible 
preferred stock in exchange for their cash investments.19 This 
preferred stock gives the holder certain management and blocking 
rights, as well as the ability to convert the instrument into a specified 
number of common shares.20 The preferred stock is also commonly 
granted a liquidation preference, so that, if the company is liquidated 
or sold prior to the preferred stock’s conversion into common shares, 
the holder will receive the stated liquidation-preference amount 
before the common stockholders divide up any remaining funds.21 The 
liquidation preference may equal the amount invested or, 
alternatively, a multiple of the amount invested; convertible preferred 
stock purchased for $1 million, for example, could have a liquidation 
preference of $1, $2, or $3 million.22 
Angel investors, by comparison, often structure their seed 
investments in the form of convertible promissory notes.23 Although 
 
 18. These shares or options typically vest over a specified period of time. Any unvested 
shares or options are forfeited if the founder or employee ceases to be employed by the 
company before they became fully vested. See Ryan J. Foreman, Comment, Employee Stock 
Options in Personal Bankruptcy: Assets or Earnings?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (2005) 
(“[T]he employee’s right to a block of options is contingent upon her continued employment 
until the vesting date. If she leaves her job (or is fired), she forfeits all rights to unvested 
options.”). 
 19. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 892 (2002) (observing that “[c]onvertible preferred 
stock is the dominant financial contract in the venture capital market”); see also Ronald J. 
Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for 
Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 902–04 (2003) (explaining tax advantages 
of convertible preferred stock). 
 20. See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 19, at 885; Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling 
Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1413–15 (2008). 
 21. See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 
347–48 (2005) (discussing liquidation preferences in VC investment agreements).  
 22. See Barry J. Kramer & Michael J. Patrick, Explanation of Certain Terms Used in 
Venture Financing Terms Survey, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.fenwick.
com/publications/pages/explanation-of-certain-terms-used-in-venture-financing-terms-survey.
aspx (explaining that preferred-stock venture-capital investments may, but do not always, have 
a “multiple liquidation preference,” typically 1.5 to 3 times the amount of the investment).  
 23. See Ibrahim, supra note 20, at 1430 n.119 (arguing that angels use convertible debt to 
avoid having to price their investments); Monica Mehta, Raising Capital with Convertible Notes, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/
jan2011/sb20110125_145583.htm (“Over the past few years [convertible promissory notes] have 
gained in popularity.”). Irrespective of whether an investor acquires a convertible note or 
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these notes, as the name suggests, are convertible into common stock, 
they typically offer fewer protections to investors than convertible 
preferred stock.24 The notes rarely provide for seats on the company’s 
board, for example.25 In the event the startup is liquidated before a 
note is converted, the noteholder traditionally was entitled to a return 
of his investment plus accrued interest. It is, however, becoming 
increasingly common for the noteholder to be entitled to an 
acquisition premium, which entitles the holder to a multiple of his 
investment (for example, double the amount of the initial investment) 
upon an acquisition of the company before a subsequent equity 
financing.26 This liquidation premium received by angel investors is 
analogous to the liquidation preference afforded the convertible 
preferred stock received by VCs. 
B. The Insatiable Demand for Engineering Talent in Silicon Valley 
The history of Silicon Valley is a story of intense competition for 
engineering talent. In her classic historical account of the region, 
Professor AnnaLee Saxenian explained how companies began 
vigorously competing for such talent as early as the 1970s, when 
“firms began to offer incentives such as generous signing bonuses, 
stock options, high salaries, and interesting projects to attract top 
people.”27 These aggressive recruiting practices continued, more or 
less unabated, through the 1980s and into the 1990s.28 Although the 
 
convertible preferred stock, founders and employees will typically own all of the outstanding 
common stock prior to conversion, although occasionally a business incubator or an early 
investor might also own a small percentage of the outstanding common stock. See Olson, supra 
note 15, at 64–65. 
 24. Upon conversion of the note or preferred stock, the holders will receive a specified 
amount of common stock, and their percentage equity interest (calculated on a postconversion 
basis) will be protected (before and after conversion) through antidilution and similar 
contractual protections. Smith, supra note 21, at 354. 
 25. For example, a 2011 study on seed financing by the law firm Fenwick & West LLP 
found that whereas preferred stockholders were granted board seats in 70 percent of financings, 
convertible noteholders were granted board seats in only 4 percent of financings. Kramer & 
Levin, supra note 16, at 6–7. 
 26. The Fenwick & West LLP study also found that 61 percent of convertible notes 
included an acquisition premium, up from 50 percent in 2010, and that the median premium in 
2011 was equal to the original principal amount. Id. at 7. In acquisitions in which the convertible 
notes convert to common stock subject to a valuation cap, the return to the investors may be 
less than the acquisition premium. 
 27. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN 
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 35 (9th prtg. 2000). 
 28. Robert A. Mamis, Golden Handcuffs, INC., Aug. 1983, at 59, 60 (“[T]he battleground is 
so keen for talent that [it] can make a company—or break it by its absence . . . .”); Miriam 
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demand for engineers waned in the years following the burst of the 
dot-com bubble, it picked up steam again less than a decade later. In 
2011, a seasoned observer described the market for engineering talent 
in Silicon Valley as the most intensely competitive that he had ever 
seen.29 
Large technology companies today are willing to offer 
extraordinary inducements to hire and retain good engineers.30 These 
inducements include generous salaries, signing bonuses, restricted 
stock, stock options, game rooms, iPads, limo service, tickets to 
sporting events, and a host of other perks.31 These inducements 
notwithstanding, there still are many engineers in Silicon Valley who 
would prefer to launch, or to participate in, a start-up venture rather 
than to work for a large technology company.32 These individuals are 
willing to accept lower salaries and fewer perks in exchange for more 
control over the company’s future, the possibility of an incredible 
fortune if the startup is successful, and the intangible benefits of 
participating in a startup in Silicon Valley, where entrepreneurship is 
cherished.33 
 
Rozen, Wanted: High-Tech Engineers, DUN’S BUS. MONTH, Mar. 1, 1985, at 35, 36 (noting that 
Microsoft chose to locate in Washington rather than Silicon Valley in part “because employees 
wouldn’t be as tempted by other companies’ offers”); Kathy Rebello, Wanted: Experienced 
Computer Programmers, USA TODAY, July 19, 1989, at 7B (“Experienced computer 
programmers are in hot demand and short supply. And companies will do almost anything to 
get their hands on them.”); Julie Schmit, High-Tech Firms Roll out Red Carpet for Top Talent, 
USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1B (listing benefits offered to attract engineers). 
 29. Jessica Guynn, Boom Is Back in Silicon Valley, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at A1. 
 30. In 2000, the CEO of Cisco famously expressed the view that “a world-class engineer 
with five peers can out-produce 200 regular engineers.” John A. Byrne, Visionary vs. Visionary, 
BUS. WK., Aug. 28, 2000, at 210.  
 31. See Jon Swartz, Tech Firms Go on a Hiring Binge Again, USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 2011, 
at 1B (“Tech workers . . . are coveted commodities as the high-tech industry undergoes its 
biggest hiring binge in more than a decade. Not since the dot-com bubble of the early 2000s has 
competition been so fierce.”); infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289, 305–
07 (1999) (discussing reasons why employees leave employers to form startups despite the 
significant tax, informational, and scope advantages of an employer over a venture-capital-
backed startup); Robles, supra note 5 (“For companies, it’s worth considering that many 
entrepreneurs aren’t going to be happy as ‘employees[.’] It’s simply not in their DNA, as they 
value the creative control and ownership that comes with entrepreneurship above just about 
everything else.”).  
 33. Homa Bahrami & Stuart Evans, Flexible Recycling and High-Technology 
Entrepreneurship, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 180–81 (Martin Kenney ed., 2000) (“Motivated by the 
opportunities for personal growth, and the potential for significant financial gain . . . many 
technical professionals forego the relative security of a large entity for the turmoil and sense of 
adventure associated with a start-up.”); id. at 181 (“Maturing firms may have difficulty matching 
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In recent years, this preference for participating in a technology 
startup over employment at a large technology company has been 
bolstered by three interrelated developments. First, the cost of 
launching a startup has fallen precipitously, as the rise of cloud 
computing has brought about a dramatic reduction in the cost of 
information technology infrastructure.34 Second, new sources of seed 
funding from business incubators, angel investors, and angel “arms” 
of venture-capital firms have become available to startups in Silicon 
Valley.35 Third, in part because of the cost savings of cloud computing 
and the abundance of seed funding, startups are now able to offer 
salaries and bonuses that are more competitive with those offered by 
 
the cultural intensity of a start-up, which is critical for building a team spirit and focusing 
emotional and creative energy on achieving the desired goal.”); see also Interview by Jessica 
Livingston with James Hong, Cofounder, HOT or NOT, in JESSICA LIVINGSTON, FOUNDERS 
AT WORK: STORIES OF STARTUPS’ EARLY DAYS 377, 384 (2008) (“If you’re not in school and 
you’re not an entrepreneur, you’re not working on new ideas. You are just a cog in someone 
else’s wheel, and you’ll never make anything new.”).  
 34. Joe McKendrick, How Cloud Computing Is Fueling the Next Startup Boom, FORBES 
(Nov. 11, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joemckendrick/2011/11/01/cloud-
computing-is-fuel-for-the-next-entrepreneurial-boom (“Thanks to cloud computing . . . it now 
costs virtually pennies to secure and get the infrastructure needed up and running to get a new 
venture off the ground.”). One study found that on-premises software and servers in a new 
business cost upwards of $40,000; the costs of a small server operation operating in the cloud, by 
contrast, were virtually zero. Id. 
 35. See Pui-Wing Tam & Spencer E. Ante, ‘Super Angels’ Fly in To Aid Start-Ups, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 16, 2010, at C1 (“As many conventional venture capitalists retreated after the 
technology bust last decade, super angels filled the gap, investing amounts from $25,000 to $1 
million in dozens of start-up companies . . . . As these microcap venture capitalists now raise 
their own funds—giving them more ammunition to participate in later financing rounds of a 
start-up company—they are siphoning off more investment deals and fund-raising dollars from 
larger venture firms.”). The funding for startups has also increased. See Peter Delevett, Is 
Silicon Valley in Another Tech-Stock Bubble?, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2011, 4:31 
PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_18671416 (“[The National Venture Capital 
Association’s] latest MoneyTree report found that $2.3 billion spread among 275 Internet deals 
during the latest quarter marked a high last seen in 2001. The trend held true in Silicon Valley, 
where $1.51 billion went into online startups, a decade-long high.”). Many of the new angels 
were early employees of hugely successful technology companies, like PayPal. Ari Levy, 
‘PayPal Mafia’ Gets Richer, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.
businessweek.com/technology/paypal-mafia-gets-richer-02212012.html; see The New Tech 
Bubble, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2011, at 13, 13 (“The bubble is being pumped partly by wealthy 
‘angel’ investors, some of whom made their fortunes in the late-1990s IPO boom. Their financial 
firepower has increased and they are battling one another for stakes in web start-ups. In some 
cases angels are skimping on due diligence to win deals.”). In the wake of these developments, a 
number of VCs have established angel investment “arms” to remain active in seed-round 
financing. See Chris Dixon, Revisited: Big VCs Investing in Seed Rounds, CHRIS DIXON (Apr. 2, 
2012), http://cdixon.org/2012/04/02/revisited-big-vcs-investing-in-seed-rounds (“A few years ago, 
the trend of companies raising smaller seed rounds combined with the emergence of new seed 
funds caused many big VCs to create seed investment programs.”).  
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larger technology companies.36 This reduction in pay differential 
means that the day-to-day standard of living enjoyed by start-up 
employees compares more favorably to the standard of living enjoyed 
by employees of large technology companies. 
The cumulative effect of these developments is that it is easier 
than ever before to finance, launch, and staff a tech startup in Silicon 
Valley. These developments have led some engineers, who might 
otherwise have joined a large technology company, to launch or join a 
startup. In light of these circumstances, the problem faced by large 
technology companies in dire need of engineering talent is how to 
extricate these individuals from the startups that currently employ 
them.37 Many companies have turned to acqui-hiring as a solution. 
C. The Acqui-hire 
In a typical acquisition, the principal purpose of the acquisition is 
to obtain ownership of the company’s assets, whether tangible (e.g., 
property, plant, and equipment) or intangible (e.g., intellectual 
property, customer lists, and goodwill). In an acqui-hire transaction, 
by contrast, the acquiring company places little or no value on the 
assets owned by the target company.38 Instead, the transaction occurs 
 
 36. Pui-Wing Tam, Start-Up Staff Getting More Cash, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2012, 5:50 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304451104577390133148700046.html 
(“According to a new study . . . the salaries and cash bonuses that closely held Silicon Valley 
start-ups are offering their workers are now on par with what publicly traded tech companies 
are paying.”). 
 37. These companies were, significantly, able to finance these acquisitions given the 
prevailing market conditions in Silicon Valley in 2011. See Brad Stone, It’s Always Sunny in 
Silicon Valley, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/its-always-sunny-in-silicon-valley-12222011.html (“It was never clearer than in 2011 
that Silicon Valley exists in an alternate reality—a bubble of prosperity. Restaurants are 
booked, freeways are packed, and companies are flush with cash. The prosperity bubble isn’t 
just a state of mind: Times are as good as they’ve been in recent memory.”). 
 38. It is not always easy to distinguish an acquisition from an acqui-hire. See Interview with 
Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, in Cal. (May 2012) (“It’s a blurry line between the 
acquisition and the acqui-hire.”). When the startup has some semivaluable intellectual property 
(IP), we were told that more and more buyers are taking it and then granting back to the startup 
a nonexclusive, perpetual royalty-free license to use it. Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley 
Law Firm I, in Cal. (May 2012). Another interviewee, however, suggested that many buyers do 
not really want the IP and are happy to let it revert to the investors. Interview with Acqui-hired 
Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, in Cal. (May 2012). Still another interviewee noted that even when 
the buyer does not want the IP, per se, it does not want to leave that asset out there for someone 
else to use. Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, in Cal. (May 2012). 
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primarily because the acquirer wishes to hire some or all of the target 
company’s at-will employees.39 
One frequently cited rationale for acqui-hiring is that it allows a 
large technology company to obtain the services of several talented 
engineers and entrepreneurs in one fell swoop.40 It also allows the 
buyer to hire an existing, well-functioning team of individuals who 
will often continue to work as a team with expertise in a certain field, 
as opposed to trying to assemble such a team from scratch.41 When 
Apple was developing its cloud-based music service, for example, it 
acqui-hired a team of engineers from Lala that had extensive 
experience in streaming music online. That team stayed together at 
Apple to work on the cloud-based music service even after Apple 
terminated the Lala service six months after the acquisition.42 An 
acqui-hire also enables the buyer to utilize the talents of its new, 
experienced employee team to enter into a new space quickly despite 
 
 39. In Silicon Valley, employment at startups is typically not governed by a fixed-term 
employment agreement; rather, employees are typically hired on an at-will basis. Interview with 
Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. Accordingly, an acquisition of a startup 
does not, standing alone, give the acquirer any contractual right to employ any of the startup’s 
employees. See Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 
37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 653 (2000) (defining at-will employment as a relationship wherein the 
employer or employee may terminate the relationship without consequences of legal liability). 
If a fixed-term employment agreement did exist, and if it did not terminate on a change of 
control (or if it were assignable by the employer in the event of a sale of its assets), then an 
acquisition of the employer or its assets would give rise to a contractual right of the acquirer to 
employ the employees; in that case, the acquirer could be viewed as acquiring an asset—namely, 
the favorable employment contract.  
 40. See Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm III, in N.Y. (Apr. 2012) 
(observing that one benefit of an acqui-hire is that “you get a cohesive team rather than one to 
two individuals”); Interview with Partner, Venture Capital Fund, in Cal. (Apr. 2012) (“[A]gainst 
the backdrop of the most difficult hiring environment for strong engineers and product people, 
[acqui-hiring] can often be the only way to ensure continued top talent—especially among the 
risk-taking type.”); Interview with Recruiter, NASDAQ 100 Co., in Cal. (Apr. 2012) (“The 
primary virtue of the acqui-hire is that it allows you to get group talent.”). 
 41. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38 (“[O]ne virtue of the 
acqui-hire is that it builds on a sense of purpose among the engineers.”); Interview with 
Engineer, NASDAQ 100 Co., in Cal. (Apr. 2012) (noting that an acqui-hire “[a]llows you to get 
a complete team . . . that already know each other rather than assemble a team yourself”).  
 42. See Bobbie Johnson, Just How Much Did Apple Pay To Buy Lala.com – and Why?, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2009, at 2 (suggesting that Apple’s acquisition of Lala was “a talent 
acquisition, in which Apple decided it wanted to hire a group of clever, seasoned and well 
respected engineers”); Brad Stone, Apple Strikes Deal To Buy the Music Start-Up Lala, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, at B2 (“One person with knowledge of the deal . . . said Apple would 
primarily be buying Lala’s engineers, including its energetic co-founder Bill Nguyen, and their 
experience with cloud-based music services.”). 
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the buyer’s inexperience in that space.43 This is especially useful in 
Silicon Valley, where the pace of technological innovations creates a 
frenetic environment in which time is frequently of the essence and 
business plans rapidly shift and pivot. 
Although an acqui-hire transaction can occur at any stage of a 
new venture’s lifecycle, it is most common after a seed round and 
before a Series A round of financing, or between Series A and Series 
B rounds of financing.44 In many cases, the transaction occurs because 
the startup was unable to develop a product and successfully bring it 
to market before it ran out of money.45 This type of acqui-hire will 
occur after it becomes clear that another round of financing will not 
be forthcoming.46 In these situations, the acqui-hire is the only 
alternative to simply liquidating the company. Our interviews 
suggested that this type of acqui-hire—as an alternative to a 
liquidation—was the most common and, accordingly, we treat this 
scenario as the prototypical acqui-hire in this Article. In a minority of 
acqui-hires, the transaction occurs in lieu of the next round of 
financing.47 In these cases, the founders decide that an exit through an 
acqui-hire transaction is more attractive than continuing the startup 
under the terms of the next round of financing.48 
 
 43. Interview with Engineer, NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 41. 
 44. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 38; Interview with 
Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, in Cal. (May 2012); Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley 
Law Firm III, supra note 40; Interview with Former Corp. Dev. Officer, NASDAQ 100 Co., in 
Cal. (Aug. 2012). One interviewee offered the following explanation for why companies were 
more likely to be acqui-hired after a seed round than at any other time: 
A company that has raised a seed round but not a full Series A or later will (1) have 
less liquidation preference to worry about . . . and (2) have few enough employees 
that it might make sense to hire the whole team. Investors will be more likely to 
approve the deal if they can get more of their liquidation preference back, and 
companies are more likely to sign up a whole team if it’s not huge and of consistently 
high quality. 
Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm III, supra note 40. 
 45. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38; Interview with 
Founder, Start-Up Co., in Cal. (Apr. 2012); see Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm 
I, supra note 38 (“Another upshot of the vast amounts of money sloshing around is that firms 
can survive long enough for a soft landing via an acqui-hire. In the old days, the startup would 
run out of money and go out of business. Everyone would send out résumés and that would be 
that.”). 
 46. See supra note 45. 
 47. Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. 
 48. Id. For example, the next round’s valuation of the company might be perceived to 
unduly dilute the interests of the founders, or the liquidation preference investors require might 
be perceived as too high. In either case, the precise terms of the next round of financing might 
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The terms and structure of an acqui-hire deal are highly 
variable.49 In its most rudimentary form, a buyer may acqui-hire a 
two-person company for as little as a few hundred thousand dollars in 
cash.50 In these cases, the transaction is typically structured as a simple 
cash payment in consideration for the startup’s covenant not to sue 
the buyer for hiring its employees; the startup thereafter liquidates 
and distributes the cash and any other assets to its shareholders.51 In 
larger deals, the acqui-hire is commonly structured as an asset sale.52 
Often, the only assets acquired by the purchaser are whatever 
intellectual property rights that the startup owns; other assets—such 
as property, plant, and equipment—are left behind.53 The 
consideration paid by the buyer and any residual assets are then 
distributed to shareholders in the liquidation of the startup. In still 
larger deals, acqui-hires may be structured as stock purchases or as 
mergers.54 In such a case, stock of the buyer may be included as part 
of the consideration, and the transaction sometimes will be structured 
as a tax-free reorganization.55 Notwithstanding these generalizations, 
acqui-hiring transactions run the gamut, with transaction structures 
and deal terms varying to take account of the specific circumstances 
surrounding the given transaction. Key facts include the number of 
employees that the buyer wishes to hire, the value of those employees 
to the buyer, the value (if any) of the startup’s intellectual property 
 
reduce the founders’ interests in the company to the point that the acqui-hire bird in the hand is 
more attractive than the possibility of the future two in the bush. 
 49. The factors affecting an acqui-hire’s terms and structure include, but are not limited to, 
the following: (1) identity of the founders, (2) technology, (3) product, (4) channels, (5) 
relationships, (6) identity of the investors, and (7) terms of the initial investment. Attorney, 
Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. 
 50. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 38; Interview with 
Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44. 
 51. See Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44. This promise not 
to sue is known as a waiver and release or, alternatively, as a covenant not to sue. Id. In these 
deals, no assets are acquired and virtually no diligence is performed by the buyer. Interview 
with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. Nevertheless, lawyers in Silicon 
Valley tend to view these deals as a form of acqui-hire because consideration flows to the 
company and the company thereafter liquidates. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law 
Firm II, supra note 44. 
 52. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38.  
 53. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 38 (“[Non-IP] assets 
of the company revert to the investors. The buyer doesn’t want them.”). 
 54. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44; Interview with 
Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. 
 55. See Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44. It is also possible 
for asset deals to be structured as tax-free reorganizations. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2006).  
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and other assets to the buyer, and the customary practices of the 
corporate development team that initiates these deals on behalf of the 
buyer. 
Despite this variability, there is one critical feature that is 
common to every acqui-hire transaction: existence of two distinct 
pools of consideration paid by the buyer.56 The first pool of 
consideration—which we call the “deal consideration”—is used to 
acquire the startup. The deal consideration usually consists of cash or 
buyer stock and is used, depending on the specific deal structure, to 
pay for the covenant not to sue, to buy all or some of the startup’s 
assets, to acquire the start-up company’s stock, or to serve as the 
merger consideration.57 When the transaction closes, the cash and 
stock that constitute the deal consideration will eventually end up in 
the hands of the startup’s outside investors and its employee 
shareholders.58 
The second pool of consideration—which we call the 
“compensation pool”—is used to compensate the startup’s founders 
and employees for their future services in favor of the buyer. Most of 
the compensation pool consists of options, restricted stock, or 
restricted-stock units in the buyer that vest over specified periods of 
employment.59 Occasionally the consideration may be performance 
vested, meaning that it vests upon the attainment of identified 
benchmarks.60 Most commonly, the consideration in the 
compensation pool is simply time vested and will completely vest 
after three or four years of employment.61 Significantly, neither 
 
 56. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44; Interview with 
Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 57. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44. 
 58. In practice, this means that the distribution is likely to occur in accordance with the 
company’s liquidating distribution waterfall. Cf. Heather M. Field, Experiential Learning in a 
Lecture Class: Exposing Students to the Skill of Giving Useful Tax Advice, 9 PITTSBURGH TAX 
REV. 43, 78 n.123 (2012) (describing the operation of such a waterfall). In cases in which the 
investment was made in the form of a convertible note, these notes will sometimes be paid a 
predetermined multiple of their face value. In other cases, the holder of the note will convert it 
to common stock and be paid as a common stockholder. 
 59. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 60. Id.  
 61. See Interview with Former Corp. Dev. Officer, NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 44 
(“[A]lmost all companies have moved away from product based milestone payments to calendar 
based milestones (tenure) . . . .”); Interview with Founder, Start-Up Co., supra note 45 (three 
years of employment); Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44 (four 
years of employment). One interviewee reported that the buyer will enter into offer letters and 
compensation deals with the engineers and that they will be offered equity in the buyer, ranging 
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outside investors nor employee shareholders who are not hired by the 
acquirer will receive anything from the compensation pool; the 
compensation pool goes only to those employees hired by the buyer. 
In practice, this means that the cash and restricted stock in the 
compensation pool will wind up in the hands of the startup’s software 
engineers, as the buyer in an acqui-hire transaction is rarely 
interested in hiring the other employees. The diagram below 
illustrates the two distinct pools of consideration paid in an acqui-
hire: 
 
Figure 1. Two Distinct Pools of Consideration Paid by the Buyer in an 
Acqui-hire Transaction 
 
 
from slightly better than market to much better than market. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 
100 Law Firm II, supra note 44. The equity will usually vest ratably on a monthly basis over 
three or four years, but often with a one-year cliff—meaning that the first year’s shares will not 
vest at all until one full year has passed. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. 
II, in Cal. (May 2012); Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
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Because of these two separate pools, a key economic issue is how 
the aggregate consideration paid by the buyer will be allocated 
between the two pools.62 Outside investors in the startup, as well as 
employee shareholders who are not hired by the buyer, would prefer 
to allocate more to the deal consideration, so as to maximize their 
share of the proceeds. On the other hand, engineers who are to be 
hired by the buyer would prefer to allocate more to the compensation 
pool, because they do not have to share that pool with investors or 
other employees.63 The buyer likewise would generally prefer to 
allocate more to the compensation pool.64 In an acqui-hire, the buyer 
is mostly, if not exclusively, interested in hiring and retaining the 
engineers. Whereas the entirety of the compensation pool will go to 
these desired employees, a substantial portion of the deal 
consideration will end up going to other parties. Paying deal 
consideration therefore is a wasteful transaction cost from the buyer’s 
perspective. Furthermore, only the compensation pool will provide 
beneficial incentives to its employees, which means that the buyer, all 
else being equal, would prefer to fund that pool over the deal-
consideration pool.65 
In allocating the buyer’s aggregate purchase price between the 
two pools, the interests of the buyer and the engineers are thus 
aligned against the interests of the investors and other shareholders of 
the startup. In fact, a number of our interviewees claimed that there 
often was some degree of collusion between the buyer and the 
engineers to structure the terms of the transaction to maximize the 
compensation pool at the expense of the deal-consideration pool.66 
Lawyers representing investors, in particular, felt that acqui-hiring 
 
 62. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38; Interview with 
Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm III, in Cal. (May 2012); Interview with Attorneys, Silicon 
Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 63. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. II, supra note 61. 
 64. Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 65. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm III, supra note 62; Interview with 
Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. The compensation pool is composed 
largely of restricted stock and other time- or performance-vested consideration, which 
encourages the engineers to remain employed by the buyer or to achieve certain performance 
benchmarks. Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. The deal 
consideration, which consists usually of cash or unrestricted stock, typically provides no such 
incentive effect. Id. Furthermore, portions of the deal consideration end up in the hands of 
people who will not work for the buyer; therefore, there will be no incentive benefits resulting 
from that consideration regardless of its form. 
 66. E.g., Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm V, in Cal. (May 2012); Interview 
with Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
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deals with terms that allocated very large proportions of the total 
consideration to the compensation pool were unfair.67 If the investors 
had not put up the seed and other funding in the first place, they 
argued, the desired team of engineers would never have been 
assembled, the team would never have had the opportunity to 
showcase its talents, and it would consequently never have been 
offered such a rich compensation package by the buyer. 
Other interviewees contended, however, that because the most 
valuable or only valuable “asset” of the acqui-hired companies is their 
at-will human capital, to which the startup had no legally cognizable 
claim, the engineers should receive the vast majority, if not all, of the 
consideration paid by the buyer.68 Furthermore, the alternative to an 
acqui-hire in many cases is for the company to liquidate,69 in which 
case the investors would receive, at best, pennies on the dollar.70 Thus, 
some argued, investors should be satisfied with any allocation to the 
deal consideration that results in a larger recovery than liquidation.71 
Turning to pricing, the overall size of an acqui-hire is, in many 
cases, driven by the number of engineers at the startup who will be 
employed by the buyer. It has been reported that a general rule of 
thumb in Silicon Valley acqui-hires is $1 million per engineer.72 
Despite this general rule of thumb, participants reported that the 
total prices for acqui-hires they had seen ranged from a few hundred 
thousand dollars to $50 million or more.73 One interviewee estimated 
 
 67. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm V, supra note 66. 
 68. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. II, supra note 61; Interview with 
Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 69. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 70. When a company is wound down, any remaining value in the business would usually be 
remitted to the outside investors, whether by virtue of the liquidation preference guaranteed by 
the terms of their preferred stock or by virtue of their status as creditors by the terms of their 
convertible notes. See supra note 58. 
 71. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. II, supra note 61; Interview with 
Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44; Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley 
Law Firm I, supra note 38. In some cases, the entrepreneurs will shop themselves to the buyer. 
Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38. In others, the investors 
will shop the entrepreneurs. Id. In still others, the buyer’s business development team will 
recommend that the corporate development team take a look. See Interview with Attorneys, 
Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 72. See Helft, supra note 3.  
 73. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38; Interview with 
Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. 
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that the total consideration paid in the median acqui-hire transaction 
was in the $3 to $6 million range.74 
D. The Existential Puzzle: Why Acqui-hire? 
The popularity of the acqui-hire presents an existential puzzle. In 
an acqui-hire, the buyer’s exclusive or primary objective is to gain 
access to the startup’s at-will employees. Given this objective, why 
does the buyer go to all of the trouble and expense of acquiring the 
company? Simply hiring these individuals away from the startup 
would be cheaper because no money would need to be paid to the 
startup’s investors or to those employees that the buyer does not wish 
to hire.75 Why then do acqui-hires even exist? 
Throughout this Article, we refer to simply hiring employees 
away from a startup through the normal channels as a “defection” 
(from the employee’s perspective) or a “poach” (from the buyer’s 
perspective) to distinguish it from an “acqui-hire.” Poaching is, of 
course, the way that most group hiring occurs in the United States. It 
is extremely unusual—indeed, it is almost unheard of outside of 
Silicon Valley—for one company to buy another company solely or 
primarily for the purpose of obtaining the future services of its at-will 
employees. The mystery, therefore, is why Facebook, Google, and 
other companies have engaged in so many acqui-hiring transactions in 
recent years when there exists a viable alternative to achieve their 
hiring goals at lower cost and with fewer complications. 
 
 74. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38. Although the level of 
acqui-hiring appears to have increased in recent years, it still represents only a portion of the 
hiring that occurs in Silicon Valley. One entrepreneur whose team was ultimately acqui-hired by 
a large technology company told us that he had been individually recruited by a number of 
other technology companies. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. II, supra 
note 61. Acqui-hiring is therefore only one of the many ways by which large technology 
companies in Silicon Valley satisfy their need for engineering talent. 
 75. This course of action could be cheaper because the engineers who accept positions with 
the buyer would continue to receive the same amounts, with the buyer keeping the rest. 
Alternatively, the total consideration paid by the buyer could remain constant, but all of the 
deal-consideration pool would be shifted into the compensation pool. In that case, the engineers 
are obviously better off. Such a buyer’s position is likewise improved because the compensation 
pool can be used to provide the engineers with even more attractive incentives to stay with the 
buyer or to meet specified performance goals. Finally, the buyer and the desired employees 
could achieve some middle ground where the buyer pays less and receives more positive 
incentive effects and the desired employees receive more value. In any of these situations, a 
defection would cut investors and the undesired employees out of the deal, leaving more for the 
buyer and the desired employees to share as they wish. 
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At first glance, one might think that acqui-hiring is sometimes 
preferred over poaching in Silicon Valley because acqui-hires 
facilitate the hiring of teams as opposed to individuals. A moment’s 
reflection, however, reveals the flaw in this argument. There is no 
apparent reason why the hiring company could not recruit and hire a 
team of at-will employees away from another company through the 
normal hiring channels. Groups of law firm partners and associates, 
for example, routinely leave one firm to join another.76 Furthermore, 
in any acqui-hire transaction, the desired employees and the buyer 
will have to negotiate the individual compensation packages on a 
person-by-person basis, meaning that there will be no negotiation 
efficiencies that result from acqui-hiring. Thus, the notion that acqui-
hires are necessary in the recruitment of teams of employees away 
from their current employer is unconvincing. These teams could just 
as easily be poached away. 
Part II considers and rejects one rationale—that acqui-hiring is a 
defensive response to the threat of litigation—that may at first glance 
appear to explain the acqui-hiring phenomenon. Part III then 
explains our theory of acqui-hiring. 
II.  ACQUI-HIRING AS A MECHANISM TO REDUCE LITIGATION 
RISK? 
One reason why parties to an acqui-hire might choose to engage 
in the acqui-hire rather than an employee defection is to eliminate or 
reduce litigation risk. If a buyer were to simply hire away all or a 
subset of a startup’s engineering team, the outside investors may be 
tempted to cause the startup to sue both the buyer and the departing 
engineers. To forestall this possibility, the buyer may structure the 
transaction as an acqui-hire.77 On this account, the payments made to 
 
 76. See, e.g., Team of Intellectual Property Litigators Joins Kasowitz in Atlanta and New 
York, KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES & FRIEDMAN LLP (May 10, 2011), http://www.kasowitz.
com/team-of-intellectual-property-litigators-joins-kasowitz-in-atlanta-and-new-york-05-10-2011 
(reporting that six partners from Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP had departed to join 
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP). 
 77. In contrast to the defection, the acqui-hire typically requires the approval of the outside 
investors in the start-up company. When the acqui-hire is structured as a sale of all or 
substantially all of the company’s assets, a sale of the company’s stock, or a merger, the 
investors will either have to affirmatively take part in the transaction (for example, agree to sell 
their stock) or will possess contractual rights to prevent the transaction from occurring. In cases 
in which the acqui-hire is consummated through the startup’s execution of a covenant not to 
sue, the buyer and the desired employees could insist that the investors (and any other 
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investors in connection with the acqui-hire through the deal 
consideration would be, in effect, payments to obtain the release of 
legal claims stemming from the buyer’s poaching of the company’s 
engineering talent.78 
Whether this account actually explains the existential puzzle of 
acqui-hiring depends on whether the investors have valid legal claims 
against the buyer or departed employees and, if so, whether the 
investors could credibly threaten to pursue these claims in court.79 If 
either one of these two conditions—the existence of valid legal claims 
and a credible threat to sue—is not present, then litigation-risk 
reduction cannot explain acqui-hiring. 
A. Validity of Legal Claims 
There are a number of legal claims that, though actionable in 
other jurisdictions, would not be viable in California if employees 
were poached in lieu of an acqui-hire. The most obvious of these 
claims would be for a breach of a covenant not to compete executed 
by the departing employee. In most jurisdictions, these covenants are 
enforceable to the extent they are reasonable in scope and duration.80 
California employment law, however, is famous for its refusal to 
enforce covenants not to compete, regardless of their scope and 
duration, except in certain limited contexts.81 In fact, scholars have 
 
shareholders, such as employees that are not desired by the buyer) also consent to the 
transaction. In each case, the investors must consent to the transaction or it will not take place. 
 78. There are many examples in which one company paid a sum of money to another 
company in connection with the hiring away of an employee. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, Nortel 
Appoints Ex-Motorola Exec as Operations Chief, NETWORK WORLD (Jan. 19, 2006, 8:57 PM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/edge/news/2006/011906-nortel-motorola.html?rl (reporting that 
Nortel paid Motorola $11.5 million to release its COO from his noncompete agreement). 
 79. Technically, any claims would be owned by the startup, but following the departure of 
the employees via a defection the startup would presumably be controlled by the investors. 
Thus, the decision about whether or not to sue would be made by the investors, and the benefits 
of a successful suit would inure mostly to them. For simplicity purposes, therefore, we refer to 
the investors as owning the claim. 
 80. See, e.g., 1 BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-
STATE SURVEY 1565, 1875 (6th ed. 2008).  
 81. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008) (“Except as provided in this chapter, 
every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or 
business of any kind is to that extent void.”). To be sure, one of the few exceptions to this 
general rule provides that noncompetes are enforceable in connection with the sale of a 
business. Id. § 16601. This exception, however, is not relevant to a defection scenario because, if 
a departing engineer had executed a noncompete, it would not have been executed in 
connection with the sale of any business. Rather, the noncompete would have been executed in 
connection with the investor’s investment in an ongoing business or, alternatively, in connection 
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argued that this unique California law and its liberating effect on 
employee mobility are partly responsible for the strength of the 
technology sector in Silicon Valley.82 Thus, under California law, even 
if the departing employees had executed a covenant not to compete 
with the startup, which would be highly unusual, it would not be 
enforceable.83 
Trade-secret law, at least in theory, could offer an alternative 
means of achieving the same effect as a covenant not to compete. A 
number of jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of “inevitable 
disclosure” in the area of trade-secret litigation.84 This doctrine 
permits an employer to obtain an injunction to prevent even an at-
will employee from going to work for a competitor if the court 
concludes that the employee will “inevitably disclose” trade secrets 
that were obtained in the course of working for the former 
employer.85 California courts have, however, explicitly declined to 
follow the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, which means that this 
particular legal avenue is likewise unavailable to a startup when 
employees are poached away.86 
Finally, if the employee had entered into a fixed-term 
employment contract with the startup, her defection could potentially 
create valid claims against the employee and the hiring company. The 
employee would be in breach of the employment agreement, whereas 
the hiring company could (depending on the nature of its recruitment 
activities) be liable for tortious interference with a contractual 
 
with the hiring of the engineer by the startup. Nevertheless, the exception is potentially relevant 
to the buyer in an acqui-hire because the buyer could impose an enforceable noncompete on 
acqui-hired employees. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.  
 82. See e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 27–40 (2003) (discussing the role played by 
this legal framework in promoting employee turnover in Silicon Valley); Ronald J. Gilson, The 
Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and 
Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607–09 (1999) (same). 
 83. Under California law, the mere inclusion of such a clause in an employment agreement 
may give rise to a claim of unfair competition against the employer. See Application Grp., Inc. v. 
Hunter Grp., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 89–90 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 84. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 85. See Gilson, supra note 82, at 622–26. 
 86. See, e.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 293 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(“Schlage and Whyte did not agree upon a covenant not to compete. We decline to impose one, 
however restricted in scope, by adopting the inevitable disclosure doctrine.”). 
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relationship.87 But start-up employees in Silicon Valley do not sign 
fixed-term employment agreements.88 Rather, they are at-will 
employees. Their departures therefore do not breach any 
employment agreement. Furthermore, under California law, the act 
of inducing an at-will employee to leave his current employer to 
accept a position with a competitor is not, by itself, actionable.89 
Although claims based on covenants not to compete, inevitable 
disclosure of trade secrets, and breaches of employment agreements 
would not be available, there are other legal claims that an aggrieved 
investor might bring against the poaching company and the defecting 
employees.90 Investors could, for example, allege a breach of the 
departing employee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to the startup, if that 
employee actively recruited other individuals to join him in going to 
work for a competitor prior to his departure.91 Likewise, depending 
 
 87. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d 1099, 1105–07 (9th Cir. 
2007) (discussing elements of a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations 
under California law). 
 88. Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. Although 
employees at Silicon Valley startups do not sign fixed-term employment agreements, virtually 
all startups require their employees to enter into nondisclosure agreements, invention 
assignment agreements, and nonsolicitation agreements as a condition of their employment. It is 
conceivable that a departing employee could be sued for breach of a nonsolicitation agreement 
if that individual provided names of his former coworkers to his new employer and the new 
employer subsequently hired those individuals. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 
841 (Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that nonsolicitation agreements, in contrast to covenants not to 
compete, are valid in California). Suits alleging breaches of nonsolicitation agreements are, 
however, vanishingly rare. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm IV, in Cal. (May 
2012). 
 89. See Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513, 515 (Cal. 2004) (“[O]ne commits no actionable 
wrong by merely soliciting or hiring the at-will employee of another.”); see also Diodes, Inc. v. 
Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25–26 (Ct. App. 1968) (“Even though the relationship between an 
employer and his employee is an advantageous one, no actionable wrong is committed by a 
competitor who solicits his competitor’s employees or who hires away one or more of his 
competitor’s employees who are not under contract, so long as the inducement to leave is not 
accompanied by unlawful action.”); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 768 cmt. i (“The 
competitor is . . . free, for his own competitive advantage, to . . . offer better contract terms, as 
by offering an employee of the plaintiff more money to work for him . . . all without liability.”).  
 90. See Jeffrey W. Kramer, The Risks of Recruiting At-Will Employees, L.A. LAW., Feb. 
2006, at 19, 21 (2005) (“Employers may still be liable for interference with economic relations 
when recruiting at-will employees if the recruiting involves breaches of fiduciary duty, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, defamation, or any conduct constituting unfair 
competition.”). 
 91. The viability of this claim would depend on whether the departing employee was a 
corporate officer or director who owed fiduciary duties to the startup. See Bancroft-Whitney 
Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 934–36 (Cal. 1966) (describing fiduciary duties owed by corporate 
officers and concluding that these duties were breached when the company president provided 
information to a competitor to facilitate his own recruitment as well as that of sixteen other 
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on the precise facts—in particular, whether the project that the 
defecting engineer works on while employed by the poaching 
company is sufficiently similar to the startup’s projects—investors 
could allege that the poaching company and the defecting engineer 
colluded to misappropriate the startup’s trade secrets.92 Although 
investors could conceivably bring other claims against the hiring 
company—such as a cause of action for unfair competition93 or for 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage94—
 
employees); GAB Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Servs., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665, 
674–75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that there was a breach of a fiduciary duty as a matter 
of law when an officer used insider knowledge to recruit seventeen employees into jobs with a 
competitor), overruled on other grounds by Reeves, 95 P.3d at 521; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 393 cmt. e (“[A] court may find that it is a breach of duty for a number of the key 
officers or employees to agree to leave their employment simultaneously and without giving the 
employer an opportunity to hire and train replacements.”). As explained below, however, 
investors have only brought suit against start-up founders in cases involving fraud or outright 
theft. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 92. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1–11 (amended 1985), adopted by CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 3426–3426.11 (West 1997 & Supp. 2013); see also Therapeutic Research Faculty v. NBTY, 
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 991, 999 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (identifying elements of a misappropriation of 
trade-secrets claim in California); Tait Graves, Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law: 
A Proposal for Harmonizing California’s Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes 
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring 2006, at 1, 3–5 (arguing that 
the California version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act preempts alternative common-law 
claims). California trade-secrets law is generally regarded as very pro-defendant. Cf. CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3426.4 (“If a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith . . . the court may award 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.”); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that California does not follow the 
doctrine of inevitable disclosure). 
 93. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008) (defining unfair competition to 
constitute “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act”); Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (observing that the California Unfair Competition 
Law is a statute that “‘borrows’ violations from other laws by making them independently 
actionable as unfair competitive practices”); Bancroft-Whitney Co., 411 P.2d at 926 (concluding 
that a hiring company was liable for unfair competition because it had benefitted from the 
breach of a fiduciary duty of a corporate officer at the target company in recruiting other 
employees). 
 94. See CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d 1099, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 
2007) (concluding that acts violating California’s Unfair Competition Law qualify as “wrongful” 
for purposes of establishing liability under a claim for intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage); Reeves, 95 P.3d at 514 (explaining that a hiring company may be liable 
under an intentional interference theory for inducing an at-will employee to leave the original 
company if the plaintiff can “plead and prove that the defendant engaged in an independently 
wrongful act—i.e., an act ‘proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, 
or other determinable legal standard’” (quoting Korea Supply Co., 63 P.3d at 954)); Am. Mortg. 
Network v. Loancity.com, No. D044550, 2006 WL 3199291, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2006) 
(describing “breach or conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty” as “independently wrongful” 
conduct for purposes of this claim); Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. Cal. Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 1258–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing what conduct qualifies as 
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these claims are likely to succeed only when the investors are also 
able to show an underlying breach of a fiduciary duty or the 
misappropriation of a trade secret.95 
B. Credibility of an Investor’s Threat To Sue 
The foregoing discussion explained that, depending on the 
precise circumstances, investors could in some cases have viable 
claims stemming from a defection of a group of employees from a 
startup to a large technology company in California. However, the 
mere existence of valid legal claims does not compel the conclusion 
that the purpose of acqui-hiring is to mitigate legal risk. First, valid 
legal claims likely exist only in a fairly narrow subset of all acqui-
hiring transactions. Second, and more importantly, investors in 
Silicon Valley are extremely reluctant to pursue legal claims against 
their former entrepreneurs. As a result, it would be extremely 
difficult for investors to credibly threaten a lawsuit, even in cases in 
which the lawsuit might be meritorious. In our interviews with acqui-
hiring participants, we were told repeatedly that no investor in Silicon 
Valley would ever sue its entrepreneurs.96 
A comprehensive search of reported state and federal cases in 
California confirms this conventional wisdom.97 Excepting cases 
 
“wrongful”); see also BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 298 (3d ed. 2010). 
 95. Whether the investors are likely to prevail on either of these claims will, moreover, 
depend heavily on the facts and circumstances surrounding the defection. One treatise states 
that liability will generally be imposed on any of these theories only when the hiring company 
has “acted maliciously, or wholly without justification, or with the primary objective of driving 
the plaintiff out of business.” Liability for Inducing Employee Not Engaged for Definite Term 
To Move to Competitor, 24 A.L.R. 3d 821 (1969 & Supp. 2013); see also Silicon Knights, Inc. v. 
Crystal Dynamics, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1303, 1305, 1309–10 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing claims that 
a California-based video-game designer raided the employees of a Canadian company). 
Another treatise notes that these claims will typically turn on “how disloyal and generally evil 
the [defendants] have been, how badly the [original company] has been damaged as a result, 
and the adequacy of the proof of those charges.” JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS: HOW TO 
PROTECT YOUR IDEAS AND ASSETS 83 (1982). In cases in which the startup was foundering and 
on the verge of liquidation before the defection, it may be difficult to prove that the plaintiff 
company had suffered any actual damages. 
 96. See Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38 (“Most 
entrepreneurs are not worried about litigation. The odds are slim that investors will sue.”); 
Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44 (“I have never heard of an 
investor who sued a founder.”). 
 97. We searched the California State and Federal Cases databases in Westlaw, examining 
cases and trial documents returned by search terms including “angel,” “dilution,” 
“entrepreneur,” “founder,” “fraud,” “freeze out,” “incubator,” “investor,” “non compete,” 
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involving allegations of fraud or outright theft,98 our search of 
Westlaw databases did not turn up a single reported case in which an 
investor in a Silicon Valley technology startup had sued its 
entrepreneurs. This result is consistent with the only published 
empirical study of litigation in the venture-capital industry which 
concluded that “[w]hen founders are involved in litigation, they are 
almost always plaintiffs.”99 Although there are many possible reasons 
for this dearth of lawsuits (including California law’s pro-employee-
mobility orientation), the one that our interviewees repeatedly cited 
was the critical importance of investor reputation in Silicon Valley. 
As one investor explained, “I’m not aware of any cases of VC-
initiated litigation . . . . We just wouldn’t do it—and we’d lose if we 
tried. And the reputational damage of suing your entrepreneurs 
would be almost irreparable.”100 
To appreciate the key role played by investor reputation in 
Silicon Valley, it is necessary to understand that entrepreneurs 
soliciting investment capital place an extremely high value on investor 
reputation in deciding with whom to partner. One study found that “a 
financing offer from a high-reputation VC is approximately three 
times more likely to be accepted by an entrepreneur” and that 
“highly reputable VCs acquire start-up equity at a 10–14% 
 
“series,” “silicon valley,” “startup,” “trade secret,” “venture capital,” and various combinations 
of these terms. 
 98. See WPP Lux. Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1044–46 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (investor sued founders for fraud); Admiral Capital Venture, I, Ltd. v. Pelczarski, 
Nos. 88-2639, 88-15594, 1989 WL 150583, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1989) (same); see also Janet 
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 497, 571 (1991) (“The sophisticated investors in such private placements (usually 
venture capitalists or established companies) do not generally sue if things turn out badly, in the 
absence of strong evidence of common-law fraud.”). 
 99. See Vladimir Atanasov, Vladimir Ivanov & Kate Litvak, The Effect of Litigation on 
Venture Capitalist Reputation 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,641, 
2007). 
 100. Interview with Partner, Venture Capital Fund, supra note 40. This insight is generally 
consistent with the views of legal scholars. See, e.g., HYDE, supra note 82, at 40 (“[C]ompanies 
[in Silicon Valley] that sue departing employees will suffer harm to their reputation.”); Ibrahim, 
supra note 20, at 1435 (“The conventional wisdom is that the tight-knit nature of communities 
such as Silicon Valley creates a reputation market among venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, 
which explains the lack of litigation between them.”). The Internet has facilitated the 
transmittal of reputational information within the venture-capital community. See D. Gordon 
Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 
133, 162–70 (1998) (discussing the potential for the Internet to be used as a means of 
disseminating information relating to venture-capital reputation). 
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discount.”101 This premium on reputation is reasonable because, as 
others have explained in great detail, the formal contracts between 
investors and entrepreneurs are notoriously incomplete, leaving 
investors with the ability to act opportunistically.102 An investor’s 
good reputation ameliorates an entrepreneur’s rightful concerns 
about opportunistic behavior.103 Investors, in turn, trade on their good 
reputation, citing it as a major reason to choose them over other 
investors. In an intensely competitive environment for venture-capital 
investment opportunities, a damaged reputation could dry up 
investment opportunities or otherwise make those opportunities 
significantly more expensive.104 
To investigate the reputations of various venture-capital firms, 
angel investors, and business incubators, entrepreneurs consult a 
variety of informal sources, including their friends and lawyers,105 as 
well as websites such as TechCrunch or Hacker News.106 Although 
these networks are not perfect, they function well in transmitting 
highly salient information to entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley.107 A 
 
 101. David H. Hsu, What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?, 59 J. FIN. 
1805, 1807 (2004). 
 102. See Utset, supra note 13, at 114–16 (“Written venture capital contracts are 
incomplete, . . . [which] leaves open the possibility that one or more of the parties will engage in 
costly ex post bargaining. . . . [T]he high-powered incentives in the contracts[] effectively grant[] 
the venture capitalist the great majority of ex post bargaining power.”). But see Michael 
Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting, 
in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP: LINKING GOVERNANCE WITH 
REGULATORY POLICY 54, 68 (Michael J. Wincop ed., 2001) (questioning the effectiveness of 
reputational constraints on VC opportunism). 
 103. See Brian Broughman, Investor Opportunism, and Governance in Venture Capital, in 
VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 347, 376–78 (surveying the literature on reputational 
constraints on VC opportunism). 
 104. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1092 (2003) (“Because the [venture-capital firm] 
needs to raise successor funds, it will have to make investments in new portfolio companies run 
by other entrepreneurs. If a [venture-capital firm] behaves opportunistically toward 
entrepreneurs in connection with previous portfolio company investments, it will lose access to 
the best new investments. This, in turn, will make raising successor funds more difficult.”); Hsu, 
supra note 101, at 1807 (“The empirical results suggest that entrepreneurs are willing to forego 
offers with higher valuations in order to affiliate with more reputable VCs.”). 
 105. See Mark C. Suchman, Dealmakers and Counselors: Law Firms as Intermediaries in the 
Development of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 33, at 71, 89 
(discussing the advising role played by lawyers). 
 106. See Smith, supra note 100, at 162–70 (discussing the potential for the Internet to be 
used as a means of disseminating information relating to venture-capital reputation). 
 107. Cf. HYDE, supra note 82, at 39 (noting that “chat groups lit up all over the Valley” after 
Intel sued two former employees for theft of trade secrets). 
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lawsuit filed against a founder would be extremely salient. 
Interviewees were emphatic that, if an investor were to sue its 
entrepreneurs, the story would immediately be posted to TechCrunch 
and would quickly become the talk of the Valley.108 Regardless of the 
merits of the suit, that investor would thereafter find it much more 
difficult to invest in startups at competitive prices.109 
The fact that investors in Silicon Valley will not bring suits 
against entrepreneurs does not mean that they lack the ability to 
sanction bad behavior by entrepreneurs. As one attorney explained, 
“VCs don’t sue their founders. They keep a list. And they tell their 
friends.”110 The implications of these informal sanctioning regimes are 
explored in the next Part. For now, it is sufficient to conclude that 
mitigation of litigation risk does not appear to explain the prevalence 
of the acqui-hire. This conclusion was repeatedly confirmed over the 
course of our numerous conversations with entrepreneurs, venture 
capitalists, and attorneys in Silicon Valley. In every interview, we 
specifically asked whether litigation risk was a significant factor 
behind the popularity of acqui-hiring. The answer that we consistently 
received was that it was not.111 
 
 108. E.g. Interview with Founder, Start-Up Co., supra note 45. 
 109. See supra note 104. Although investors could, in theory, file a suit against the hiring 
company without naming the departing employees as defendants, this course of action will often 
not be attractive. Consider, for example, the investor’s potential claims of unfair competition 
and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The clearest way to prevail 
on such claims would be to prove that a departing employee, who was also a corporate officer, 
breached a fiduciary duty to the original company and that the hiring company benefitted from 
the breach. See supra note 91. In fact, all of the investor’s potentially viable legal claims against 
the hiring company will necessarily involve allegations of wrongful conduct by the former 
employees. For a description of potential legal claims resulting from an employee defection 
from a startup, see supra Part II.A. Thus, even if the former employee is not actually a 
defendant, she would still be deposed aggressively by the investor’s lawyer. In these 
circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the entrepreneurial community will appreciate the fact 
that the investor, despite assailing the former entrepreneur’s conduct and character, has not 
technically sued the entrepreneur. Certainly, investors would not rely on word of mouth and 
other informal reputational scorecards to maintain such a fine distinction. 
 110. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm V, supra note 66. 
 111. This statement is subject to two minor qualifications. In one conversation with a Silicon 
Valley lawyer, we were told that the acqui-hire was driven in part by a “pathological avoidance 
of legal risk.” Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. In another, 
we asked a lawyer about the reasons why companies would pursue an acqui-hire as opposed to a 
defection, and he stated immediately that it was to protect against a lawsuit. Interview with 
Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm V, supra note 66. When we then asked if he had ever heard of 
an investor suing its founders, however, the attorney acknowledged that he had not. Id. 
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III.  A THEORY OF ACQUI-HIRING 
If acqui-hiring is not a defensive response to the threat of 
litigation, then we are back to the existential puzzle. If what the buyer 
really wants is the engineers, why not just hire them away? Or, to put 
it another way, why does a buyer principally or exclusively interested 
in hiring a team of software engineers agree, in effect, to make 
wasteful side payments to investors and other employees of the 
startup? 
In this Part, we seek to answer this question by providing a 
comprehensive theory of acqui-hiring. Drawing on interviews with 
acqui-hiring participants, as well as on academic literature across a 
range of areas, we argue that there is no single factor that drives the 
buyer and the engineers to adopt this transaction structure. Rather, 
the decision to engage in an acqui-hire appears to be the product of a 
host of factors, some of which are interrelated. 
We argue that a number of nonlegal mechanisms—including 
reputational concern, self-image, and a desire to avoid social 
sanctions—serve to constrain the desire of entrepreneurs to pursue 
short-term financial gains through defection.112 Acqui-hires are also 
preferred because entrepreneurs derive significantly more prestige in 
Silicon Valley by “selling” their startup to a leading technology 
company than by quitting the startup to join that same company. In 
addition, the culture of Silicon Valley and its legal community 
encourages entrepreneurs to take a cooperative—rather than an 
adversarial—view of venture-capital transactions, which encourages 
acqui-hiring. From the buyer’s perspective, moreover, the acqui-hire 
structure may result in modest reputational benefits, make it easier 
for the buyer to differentiate the pay packages of similarly situated 
engineers, and facilitate the buyer’s ability to retain engineering 
talent. 
In addition, the mechanics of acqui-hiring also promote the 
technique by reducing the perceived and actual costs of acqui-hiring 
to the entrepreneurs. Well-documented cognitive biases may lead the 
 
 112. The concern in this context about entrepreneurial opportunism is ironic because much 
of the venture-capital literature focuses on the opportunities for the investors to act 
opportunistically at the expense of the entrepreneurs. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. 
Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. 
FIN. ECON. 243, 261–63 (1998) (discussing reputational constraints on venture-capitalist 
opportunism). But see Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control 
in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 990 (2006) (discussing entrepreneurial opportunism). 
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entrepreneurs to undervalue the costs they incur when funds are 
deflected to investors and other shareholders in an acqui-hire. In 
addition, tax considerations reduce the actual costs incurred by the 
entrepreneurs because acqui-hires convert ordinary income into 
capital gains. Our theory of acqui-hiring, therefore, is that acqui-hires 
occur because the aggregate of the benefits to the parties described in 
the previous paragraph exceed the costs to the entrepreneurs, after 
those costs have been adjusted to take account of cognitive biases and 
tax effects. 
A. Informal Sanctions and Reputational Harm 
Because the enforceability of covenants not to compete is strictly 
limited by California law, it is difficult to negotiate adequate ex ante 
protections against defections by at-will employees. The contracts 
negotiated between Silicon Valley start-up investors and 
entrepreneurs are thus incomplete in that they do not address this 
contingency.113 In the absence of any contractual provisions that 
inhibit defections, investors have no formal legal protections apart 
from those identified in Part II, which they are generally loath to 
pursue.114 Nevertheless, acqui-hiring transactions are now 
commonplace in Silicon Valley. To explain this anomaly, we argue 
that it is necessary to look past the formal means of enforcing 
contractual obligations and look, instead, to informal mechanisms.115 
 
 113. See Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 999 
(1992) (describing an incomplete contract as “any contract short of the ideal of a complete 
contingent contract, which has been drafted with all contingencies in mind and provides for 
optimal performance on every contingency”). We discuss in Part IV.B some possible contractual 
protections that may benefit investors. As discussed above, it is rare for individuals who go to 
work for startups to be required to sign fixed-term employment agreements; instead they are 
merely at-will employees. Consequently, it is unclear whether the investors would be adequately 
protected even if California courts enforced noncompetes. See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon 
Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
71, 82–83 (2008) (explaining that although some scholars “attribute[] Silicon Valley’s advantage 
to . . . California refus[ing] to enforce non-competition agreements[,] . . . much more remains to 
be learned about entrepreneurship when viewed through the lens of law”). 
 114. See supra Part II. This does not mean that investors do not have other, nonlegal 
mechanisms to encourage employees to stay with a start-up company. Incentive compensation, 
such as restricted stock and unvested stock options, provide carrots to encourage loyalty. But in 
cases in which the startup is failing or “going sideways,” the typical fact pattern in which an 
acqui-hire occurs, the incentive to stay provided by such compensation is drastically weakened.  
 115. We make no claim that these dynamics are unique to Silicon Valley or to the 
technology industry. There are doubtless other industries in which informal sanctions may play 
a similar role in determining the manner in which an employee chooses to leave one firm for 
another. 
COYLE POLSKY IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  4:06 PM 
2013] ACQUI-HIRING 313 
In developing this argument, we draw upon a rich literature that 
explains the relationship between formal legal rules and institutions, 
on the one hand, and social norms and informal sanctioning regimes, 
on the other. Professor Robert Ellickson famously argued, for 
example, that ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California, rely 
on informal social norms—as opposed to formal legal rules—to 
resolve disputes arising out of the construction of boundary fences.116 
Professor Lisa Bernstein likewise concluded that social norms play a 
critical role in resolving disputes between merchants in the diamond117 
and cotton trades.118 And Professor Stewart Macaulay found in his 
classic account that businessmen in Wisconsin in the early 1960s 
virtually never turned to litigation to resolve their disputes, preferring 
to rely instead on informal sanctioning regimes.119 These and other 
case studies provide rich accounts of the role played by social norms 
in shaping behavior across a number of different communities. 
Other scholars have, in turn, drawn upon these and other studies 
to advance theoretical frameworks to explain when parties choose to 
rely on informal sanctions instead of formal legal ones. Professor 
David Charny, for example, has argued that the decision to enforce 
an agreement via formal or informal means will depend on “the costs 
of gathering information and of drafting and enforcing agreements.”120 
Professors Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott have 
shown how parties sometimes “braid” together formal and informal 
mechanisms for enforcing contractual commitments.121 Amid this 
widespread interest in social norms, the focus has generally been on 
 
 116. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
 117. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992).  
 118. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745–46 (2001); see also Eric A. 
Feldman, The Tuna Court: Laws and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 313, 316 (2006) (examining “whether, when, [and] why informal norms rather than state-
created law prevail in certain settings”). 
 119. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963). 
 120. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
373, 392 (1990). 
 121. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The 
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1377 (2010); see also Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1675–92 (2003) (discussing the relationship between formal and 
informal enforcement of deliberately indefinite agreements). 
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the role played by these norms in resolving disputes without resort to 
litigation.122 In this Section, we advance the novel claim that these 
norms can lead, and have led, to parties utilizing a unique transaction 
structure to prevent a dispute from arising in the first place. 
There are, broadly speaking, three types of informal sanctions 
that may be imposed by one party (here, the investors) upon another 
(the entrepreneurs), if the latter were to defect en masse to another 
company.123 First, investors could threaten to refuse to finance the 
entrepreneur’s subsequent endeavors.124 This threat is amplified by 
the likelihood that other investors will learn about the entrepreneur’s 
defection and similarly refuse to invest.125 Second, investors may 
appeal to the entrepreneur’s sense of moral obligation toward those 
who have backed her venture.126 Third, investors may threaten to 
ostracize the defecting entrepreneur from the social community.127 In 
our interviews, we found that each of these three informal sanctioning 
methods plays a role in promoting the acqui-hire in Silicon Valley. 
1. Future Dealings.  One potential constraint on the willingness 
of an entrepreneur to act opportunistically is the threat that the 
investor will refuse to deal with him in the future.128 When an engineer 
 
 122. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 119, at 61 (explaining that many product manufacturers 
routinely accept cancellation of orders rather than pursuing litigation for breach of contract 
because, as one salesman explained, “You can’t ask a man to eat paper [the firm’s product] 
when he has no use for it”). 
 123. Gilson et al., supra note 121, at 1392–94 (2010); see also ELLICKSON, supra note 116, at 
131 (offering a typology of nonlegal sanctions); Charny, supra note 120, at 392–97 (same).  
 124. See Gilson et al., supra note 121, at 1392 (“One type of informal enforcement is the 
threat that one party to an informal contract will respond to its counterparty’s breach by 
reducing or terminating future dealings.”). 
 125. See id. at 1392–93 (“Even where the particular parties do not expect to deal with each 
other in the future, the tit-for-tat informal enforcement structure will still work if a misbehaving 
party expects to trade with others in the future—i.e., if trade will be multilateral rather than 
bilateral—so long as that party’s reputation—i.e., the collective experience of others who have 
previously dealt with that person—becomes known to future counterparties.”). 
 126. See id. at 1393 (“A second type of informal enforcement is normative or 
dispositional . . . . [E]xperimental evidence . . . indicates a widespread, but not universal, taste 
for reciprocity—an inclination to reward cooperators and punish opportunists even when the 
subjects derive no direct and particular benefits from doing so.”). 
 127. See id. at 1393–94 (“Third, normative or dispositional informal sanctions can operate at 
the level of social groups rather than among individuals. In compact and homogenous 
communities, for instance, the community as a whole can sanction the breach of one member’s 
obligation to another by ostracizing the malefactor . . . .”). 
 128. Id. at 1392; see also Charny, supra note 120, at 393 (“[Another] type of nonlegal 
sanction is loss of reputation among market participants. . . . If the promisor improperly 
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at a startup chooses to accept a position at a large technology 
company, both parties recognize that it may not be a lengthy 
employment relationship. The standard employee retention package 
in Silicon Valley contains equity incentives that vest over a period of 
three or four years.129 Interviewees explained that it would not be 
unusual for an acqui-hired entrepreneur to leave the buyer at the end 
of the vesting period, if not sooner, to launch another startup.130 In 
fact, several former founders mentioned that they viewed their 
current employment at large technology companies as a way station 
between start-up ventures.131 
Whether an entrepreneur will be able to raise funds for a new 
venture will depend, at least in part, on his relationship with the 
investors who had funded his last venture. When you start a company, 
we were told, the first place you look is to the people who funded you 
the last time.132 Even if these previous investors decline to invest, their 
opinions will still impact the ability of the new venture to obtain 
funding. In Silicon Valley, previous investors often vouch for an 
entrepreneur and also provide leads and recommendations for 
funding when they are unwilling or unable to invest themselves.133 
Entrepreneurs who aspire to start another venture someday will 
therefore desire to remain on good terms with their previous 
investors. In game-theoretic terms, the relationship between the 
entrepreneur and the investing community in Silicon Valley is a 
multistage game in which the optimal strategy often may not be to 
 
breaches his commitments, he damages his reputation and thereby loses valuable opportunities 
for future trade.”). 
 129. See Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44; Interview with 
Former Corp. Dev. Officer, NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 44. 
 130. Whether this will in fact occur in the majority of cases is open to debate. See Ibrahim, 
supra note 20, at 1436 n.155 (“[T]here is some question as to whether the typical entrepreneur is 
a ‘serial’ entrepreneur . . . .”). Nevertheless, the culture of Silicon Valley lionizes the serial 
entrepreneur, and this perception tends to inform the expectations of both the buyer and the 
entrepreneur. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38; Interview 
with Partner, Venture Capital Fund, supra note 40. 
 131. E.g., Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38; see also 
Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 132. Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 133. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38; Interview with 
Founder, Start-up Co., supra note 45; see also WPP Lux. Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, 
Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the claim that an entrepreneur concealed 
potentially fraudulent activities from his investors because he wanted to use the good reputation 
of the investors to attract additional investors). 
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maximize one’s winnings in the first stage of the game.134 The 
entrepreneur’s desire to maintain his reputation, we were told 
repeatedly, can and does serve to check his incentive to extract 
everything he can from the current venture.135 This may explain the 
prevalence of the acqui-hire structure, in which part of a portion of 
the entrepreneur’s compensation package is effectively deflected to 
the investors, as contrasted with the defection model, in which the 
entrepreneur gets to keep everything. 
The prospect of future dealings as a check on entrepreneurial 
opportunism appears to vary with the prominence of the investor in 
the original venture. If the investor is Sequoia Capital—perhaps the 
 
 134. Several interviewees noted that the entrepreneur’s perspective shifts when his 
individual payout hits about $10 million. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, 
supra note 38; Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. II, supra note 61. At this 
point, there is enough money at play that the entrepreneur will start to view the negotiations as 
a single-play game. As discussed above, however, it is rare for an acqui-hiring deal to generate 
an individual payout that is this large. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 135. It is possible, though unlikely, that the acqui-hire will diminish in importance because 
reputation becomes less important as a constraint on entrepreneurial opportunism in Silicon 
Valley. As communities grow larger, information about potential business partners often 
becomes more costly both to obtain and to verify. See Barak D. Richman, Essay, Firms, Courts, 
and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2328, 2340 n.36 (2004) (“[R]eputation mechanisms may weaken when relied upon beyond 
small communities . . . .”). But see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups 
to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 365 n.31 (2003) (“[T]he salient theoretical issue is 
not the size of the relevant community per se. Rather, it is the community members’ ability to 
monitor instances of noncooperation and communicate with fellow members about each 
member’s reputation . . . .”). If those reputational constraints that currently exist in Silicon 
Valley were to grow weaker as a result of an increase in the size of this community, then one 
might expect to see fewer acqui-hires and more defections, as well as more litigation over 
defections. This reputational argument must account, however, for the fact that Silicon Valley 
has already undergone tremendous growth over the past few decades. Between 1975 and 2010, 
for example, the number of venture-capital firms in Silicon Valley increased from 
approximately 38 to 718, based on data from Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert database. 
Between 1975 and 2008, the number of lawyers in Palo Alto—considered by many to be the 
heart of the Silicon Valley legal community—listed in the Martindale-Hubbell directory of 
lawyers grew from approximately 489 to 2,156. Data from both databases are on file with the 
Duke Law Journal. This growth notwithstanding, reputation still appears to matter a great deal 
in Silicon Valley. The key to understanding this apparent incongruity is to recognize the role 
played by technology in facilitating the transmission of information. Cf. Charny, supra note 120, 
at 419 (“[M]ass markets based on reputational bonds are feasible only with technology that 
conveys information cheaply to a large group of transactors, such as computers used to monitor 
creditworthiness or mass media used in advertising.”). The fact that not all members of a 
community personally interact with one another on a regular basis matters little if these same 
individuals have access to and regularly internalize the same information. So long as 
information about past behavior is reliably conveyed to all or a significant portion of the 
community, then it is irrelevant whether it is conveyed over a backyard fence or via a blog like 
TechCrunch. 
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best-known venture-capital firm in Silicon Valley—we were told that 
the entrepreneur will go to great lengths to end the current venture 
on good terms.136 In the acqui-hiring context, this would mean making 
sure that Sequoia—or any other well-regarded VC—received a 
payout from the buyer large enough for it to feel as though it had 
been treated fairly. If, on the other hand, the investor is a smaller 
angel investor who is not well connected, then the entrepreneur will 
be less concerned about leaving on good terms.137 Such an angel 
investor might be unable to finance any future ventures and, 
moreover, would be a small-enough player that any negative 
assessment would not generate traction in the Silicon Valley investor 
community.138 Between these two extremes—Sequoia and the novice 
angel—there is obviously a wide range. In all cases, however, it seems 
that entrepreneurs try to figure out, as one interviewee put it, “the 
lowest amount [that must be paid] to investors so that [they] don’t 
squawk.”139 
2. Loyalty.  Another informal constraint on the willingness of an 
entrepreneur to act opportunistically is the person’s sense of loyalty 
to her investors.140 In many cases, the investor is much more than a 
source of capital. The investor is also a trusted counselor, a valued 
source of industry contacts, and a partner in a shared undertaking.141 
If a large technology company were to contact the founders with job 
offers, it would not be an easy decision simply to abandon the 
investor and move elsewhere with their team, even if nothing in any 
of the investment agreements expressly forbade it. Indeed, many 
entrepreneurs would view a decision to defect to another company 
when there exists at least the possibility of recovering a portion of the 
 
 136. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38. 
 137. If the angel investor were well connected or were a so-called “super angel,” however, 
this conclusion would not necessarily follow. See Tam & Ante, supra note 35 (“What elevates 
super angels into an unofficial upper class generally is the magnetic effect their participation in a 
deal has on other investors . . . .”). 
 138. See Ibrahim, supra note 20, at 1435–36 (discussing other constraints on the abilities of 
angel investors to utilize reputational sanctions against opportunistic entrepreneurs). 
 139. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
 140. Gilson et al., supra note 121, at 1393; see Charny, supra note 120, at 393–94 (“[Another] 
type of nonlegal sanction is the sacrifice of psychic and social goods. The breaching promisor 
may suffer . . . loss of self-esteem, feelings of guilt, or an unfulfilled desire to think of himself as 
trustworthy and competent.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 141. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 112, at 968–69 (“VCs also provide valuable management 
and strategic advice to these startups, many of which are founded by entrepreneurs with little 
business experience.”). 
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investor’s investment as supremely disloyal. As one entrepreneur 
explained, “A founder wants to do right by anyone who has invested 
in him. He would like to at least get the money back for his 
investors.”142 
Although there are likely to be some entrepreneurs who feel 
little sense of loyalty to their investors, there are many others who 
would prefer an acqui-hire transaction to a defection precisely 
because it allows the investor to recoup some or all of her investment 
or perhaps even make a profit.143 One entrepreneur whose company 
was acqui-hired told us that he had fought to make sure that his 
investors got their money back, not because he was looking ahead to 
his next venture, but simply because it was “the right thing to do.”144 
According to a venture capitalist who has been involved in a number 
of acqui-hiring transactions, “Often the [entrepreneurs] do feel 
loyalties to their investors to not abandon them unless [the investors] 
can get their money back (or some portion thereof), so they hold the 
acquirer ‘hostage’ to doing that if it wants them to work there.”145 
Whether one labels this impulse “loyalty,” “fairness” or simply a 
desire to “do the right thing,” there is little question that it can and 
does serve as a check on profit maximization by entrepreneurs in 
some cases. 
In addition to the desire to do right by the investors, founders 
may also feel a moral obligation to those employees at the startup 
who will not be hired by the buyer. These employees will frequently 
own small equity stakes in the startup. In an acqui-hire transaction, 
they may receive some portion of the deal consideration, though they 
will receive none of the compensation pool. On the other hand, in a 
defection these employees would receive nothing. Like the investors, 
these employees believed in the founders, and they also probably 
sacrificed pay and other opportunities to join the startup. To repay 
 
 142. Interview with Founder, Start-Up Co., supra note 45. 
 143. The degree of loyalty that an entrepreneur feels toward an investor will depend on any 
number of factors, including the length of the relationship and the extent to which the investor 
has devoted her time and energy to the startup. When a startup is acqui-hired six months after 
its founding, and when the investor has gone to only six board meetings and has not been 
meaningfully involved with the company, the entrepreneurs are likely to feel less loyal than 
when the relationship has been longer and more meaningful. Interview with Corp. Dev. Officer, 
NASDAQ 100 Co., in Cal. (June 2012). 
 144. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. II, supra note 61. 
 145. Interview with Partner, Venture Capital Fund, supra 40. 
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this loyalty, some founders may prefer acqui-hiring over a defection 
even though it reduces their own personal gains.146 
3. Social Sanctions.  A third constraint on short-term profit 
maximization by entrepreneurs is the threat of social sanctions.147 
Social sanctions bring about compliance with a community norm by 
shaming noncompliant individuals and excluding them from the social 
benefits of belonging to a group.148 This particular constraint is 
perhaps most relevant in the context of smaller angel investors, 
precisely the type of investors who may find it quite difficult to 
impose meaningful future dealings sanctions. The academic literature 
suggests that angel investors tend to invest in people and businesses 
that are geographically proximate to their homes.149 This makes it 
easier for angel investors to monitor the companies in which they 
invest and also to impose social sanctions on those entrepreneurs who 
they view as acting opportunistically. 
One angel investor, for example, told us that he invests with 
people only if he knows where they live. If a startup fails 
notwithstanding the entrepreneur’s best efforts, then there will be no 
hard feelings.150 If, however, the startup fails because the entrepreneur 
shirked or because he defected to a large technology company with 
the engineering team without making any effort to ensure that the 
investor is “taken care of,” then social sanctions could be imposed. 
Although the social sanctions that could be levied in a relatively large 
community such as Silicon Valley pale in comparison to those that 
can be leveled by more homogenous and close-knit communities, 
there is little doubt that the threat of social sanctions may, in some 
cases, encourage entrepreneurs to pursue an acqui-hire over a 
defection.151 
 
 146. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. II, supra note 61. 
 147. Gilson et al., supra note 121, at 1393–94. 
 148. Id. at 1393–94; see also Bernstein, supra note 118, at 1749 (“[A] transactor’s . . . position 
in the community[] and his social connections were intertwined with his business reputation, 
making breach of contract something that would hurt not only his business prospects but also 
his standing in his social community.”). 
 149. Wong, supra note 14, at 75. 
 150. See Bahrami & Evans, supra note 33, at 177 (“In Silicon Valley there is no stigma 
attached to honest failure, although there is for resting on one’s laurels or not playing the 
game.”). 
 151. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm V, supra note 66; see also John Seely-
Brown, Foreward to UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 33, at xii (“Even at a more 
informal level, however—at parties, at restaurants, at sports events, at your kid’s school—you 
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B. Optics and Reputational Benefits 
In addition to enabling entrepreneurs to avoid reputational 
harm, the sale of a company pursuant to an acqui-hire may also play a 
role in improving the reputation of those entrepreneurs in Silicon 
Valley. There is undoubtedly a cultural cachet that comes with selling 
one’s startup to a leading company, particularly in Silicon Valley.152 In 
fact, one lawyer suggested that the social status that entrepreneurs 
derive from being able to claim that they sold their company could be 
the primary factor behind the acqui-hiring phenomenon.153 
Certainly an acqui-hire is a more positive story than the one that 
would accompany a defection. As one investor put it, “[I]t’s a lot 
cooler to say you ‘sold’ your company even if everyone [that is, all the 
investors] lost money than to say your company was an utter failure 
and you put it into liquidation proceedings and grabbed a nice offer 
from Google.”154 Or as another interviewee explained, “The talent 
wants the mystique of having been bought out.”155 Or as still another 
interviewee observed: 
[S]ome of these ‘acqui-hires’ are cosmetic things. It’s not really 
much of an acquisition at all but just an assuming of employees with 
some modest signing bonuses and retention payments. Then you add 
all of this stuff up and send out a press release that says you were 
acquired for $8 million when in reality that’s the value of the stock 
those employees would have gotten anyway for joining.156 
 
discover whom you need to meet [in Silicon Valley], who is worth working with, whom you 
should avoid, etc.”); cf. Bernstein, supra note 118, at 1749 (“Deeply rooted social forces, such as 
the culture of honor in the Old South and the close-knit nature of many small town mill 
communities, helped to ensure that a transactor’s sense of self-esteem, his position in the 
community, and his social connections were intertwined with his business reputation, making 
breach of contract something that would hurt not only his business prospects but also his 
standing in his social community.”). 
 152. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm V, supra note 66 (“After you tell 
someone that you sold your company, it is rare that you get to the next level of conversation. 
Nobody ever asks how much you sold it for or whether you screwed your investors.”). 
 153. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44. Indeed, sometimes 
people stretch the definition of acqui-hire to the point that it is used to cover even transactions 
in which no acquisition of the corporate entity or the assets thereof actually occurs. See supra 
note 51 and accompanying text. 
 154. Interview with Partner, Venture Capital Fund, supra note 40. 
 155. Interview with Recruiter, NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 40. 
 156. Interview with Partner, Venture Capital Fund, supra note 40; see also Paul Graham, 
Hiring Is Obsolete, PAULGRAHAM.COM (May 2005), http://www.paulgraham.com/hiring.html 
(“Often big companies buy startups before they’re profitable. . . . What they want is the 
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The optics can also affect the ability of the entrepreneur to 
receive financing for a future project.157 “You’re more likely to be 
backed the next time you have a startup if you have an ‘exit’ under 
your belt,” one interviewee explained.158 “Most good investors can tell 
the difference [between a bona fide acquisition and a mere acqui-
hire] but many don’t bother to do the research—especially at the 
angel-investor stage.”159 
The optics of an acqui-hire can also be beneficial to investors, 
albeit to a lesser extent. Individuals and firms who invest in early-
stage companies expect the overwhelming majority of these 
companies ultimately to fail. They continue to make investments, 
however, in the hopes of hitting a few “home runs,” which can return 
as much as thirty times their initial investment or more.160 Against this 
backdrop, these investors tend to view companies that are acqui-hired 
as not meaningfully different from those companies that fail. When 
the measure of success is a thirtyfold return, then the difference 
between a portfolio company that is a complete loss and one that 
“goes sideways” is immaterial. Nevertheless, there are some 
nonfinancial benefits that flow to investors as a result of acqui-hires.161 
From the perspective of an angel investor or a VC trying to convince 
an entrepreneur to partner with him over other investors, or of a VC 
 
development team and the software they’ve built so far. When a startup gets bought for 2 or 3 
million six months in, it’s really more of a hiring bonus than an acquisition.”). 
 157. The optical benefits from acqui-hiring may diminish over time as the phenomenon 
receives greater attention and scrutiny. If acqui-hires become known as simply dressed-up 
defections, rather than real “exits,” the cultural cachet of doing an acqui-hire will likely 
diminish. In fact, the popular press now sometimes explicitly distinguishes between acqui-hires 
and real acquisitions in reporting on Silicon Valley merger-and-acquisition activity. See, e.g., 
Laurie Segall, Facebook Acquires Facial Recognition Startup Face.com, CNNMONEY (June 18, 
2012, 1:55 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/18/technology/startups/facebook-acquires-face/
index.htm (noting, in reporting that Facebook acquired Face.com, that “Facebook is famous for 
doing ‘acqui-hires,’ scooping up talented staff and then shutting down their services, but a 
source close to Facebook emphasized that Face.com’s technology will remain intact”). 
 158. Interview with Partner, Venture Capital Fund, supra note 40. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, VALUING PRE-REVENUE COMPANIES 
19 (2007), available at http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/data/Documents/Resources/Angel
CapitalEducation/ACEF_-_Valuing_Pre-revenue_Companies.pdf (noting a target return on 
investment for angels of 30 percent); Paul Graham, Black Swan Farming, PAULGRAHAM.COM 
(Sept. 2012), http://www.paulgraham.com/swan.html (“[I]n purely financial terms, there is 
probably at most one company in each YC batch that will have a significant effect on our 
returns, and the rest are just a cost of doing business.”). 
 161. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44; Interview with 
Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
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raising capital for a new fund, it is better to be able to say that a 
portfolio company was acquired by Google than to say that it failed, 
even if the economics between the two outcomes are not materially 
different. As one interviewee explained, “[T]he exit is worth 
something. Particularly for [venture-capital] funds in progress, the 
scorecard may ignore the money and say that four [portfolio 
companies] are dead, three are exited . . . , and seven are alive. The 
exits matter.”162 
Because investors would always prefer an acqui-hire (in which 
they receive at least some of the buyer’s payments) over a defection 
(in which they receive nothing), the investors’ preference for the 
optics of acqui-hires is not directly relevant to the puzzle we are 
exploring. Recall, however, that reputational concerns can cause 
entrepreneurs to prefer acqui-hires at the margin. Because investors 
place some value on the optics of acqui-hires, the amount that must 
be paid to investors to keep them from squawking is reduced. In some 
cases, the optics premium that investors receive might bridge the gap 
between the amount that the entrepreneurs are willing to deflect to 
investors and the amount that investors would view as minimally 
acceptable. 
C. The Buyer’s Perspective 
The foregoing discussion focused on the entrepreneurs’ 
preferences for acqui-hires over defections. The question arises, 
however, whether buyers have the same preference or whether they 
are indifferent between the two methods of acquiring talent. On this 
question, our interviewees expressed contrasting views. 
One stated, for example, that buyers did strive to maintain good 
relations with prominent angel investors and VCs and would, 
therefore, prefer an acqui-hire transaction structure.163 Another 
indicated that buyers might prefer acqui-hiring so as to “preserve the 
start-up ecosystem [in Silicon Valley].”164 One interviewee suggested 
that individuals working in buyers’ corporate-development groups 
often aspire to eventually work for VCs.165 These buyer 
 
 162. Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm III, supra note 40. 
 163. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38. 
 164. Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. Acqui-hiring would 
preserve the start-up ecosystem by paying investors for failed or failing startups, which 
effectively subsidizes venture-capital investment. 
 165. Interview with Former Corp. Dev. Officer, NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 44. 
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representatives would therefore tend to promote transaction 
structures—such as acqui-hires—that would keep them in the good 
graces of those firms; on this account, acqui-hiring is the product of an 
agency problem between the buyer and its agents.166 However, all of 
our interviewees agreed that whatever buyer reputational concerns 
exist, they pale in comparison to the reputational concerns of the 
entrepreneurs. 
Other interviewees were skeptical that buyers or their 
representatives might be at all concerned about their reputation in 
the VC community, emphasizing that the buyers have billions of 
dollars of purchasing power, which allows them not to worry much 
about their reputations among start-up investors. One interviewee 
familiar with the workings of the corporate-development group at a 
leading technology company demurred when asked about whether 
buyers are concerned about their reputation among start-up 
investors, stating simply that “[a]t the end of the day the job is to 
figure out the right value for everything” and that there are “[v]ery 
few deals where everyone is happy.”167 This individual suggested that 
large technology companies are far more concerned about getting the 
best value for their money than about their reputation among VCs.168 
There are, however, two factors unrelated to reputation that may 
encourage a buyer to engage in acqui-hiring.169 First, the acqui-hire 
structure allows buyers to differentiate the pay packages of similarly 
situated engineers.170 When new engineers are simply hired, any such 
differentiation would have to be made within the engineer’s 
compensation package, which could disrupt the buyer’s existing salary 
structure, leading potentially to resentment among existing 
employees. In an acqui-hire, differentiation could be accomplished 
via the deal consideration and, therefore, would not (at least 
superficially) disrupt the salary structure. Acqui-hiring, therefore, 
allows buyers to provide a de facto signing bonus to desired 
engineers. 
Second, we were told that it is not uncommon for buyers to 
require acqui-hired engineers to sign a covenant not to compete. One 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Interview with Corp. Dev. Officer., NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 143. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Our interviewees emphasized that these two factors, though supporting acqui-hiring at 
the margin, were much less important than the reputational factors discussed above. 
 170. Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38. 
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leading acqui-hirer, for example, routinely requires acqui-hired 
employees to promise not to compete for one to two years after their 
departure.171 Although covenants not to compete are generally 
unenforceable in California, these covenants may be enforced when 
they are executed in connection with the sale of a business.172 An 
acqui-hire is a sale of a business and, therefore, it would trigger an 
enforceable covenant not to compete.173 One additional virtue of an 
acqui-hire from the perspective of the buyer, therefore, is that it 
allows for these enforceable covenants, which would not be possible if 
the engineer had simply been poached. 
D. The Unique Culture of Silicon Valley and Its Legal Community 
In addition to the various considerations discussed above, the 
prevalence of acqui-hiring may also be attributable to cultural norms 
that are unique to Silicon Valley. The culture of Silicon Valley has 
been described as one that generally “depicts venture capital 
transactions as being natural and desirable rather than as being 
‘evil’ . . . and oppositional.”174 In such a culture, one would expect 
transaction structures that promote cooperation between investors 
and entrepreneurs to evolve as a means of discouraging “an 
 
 171. Interview with Former Corp. Dev. Officer, NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 44.  
 172. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 173. This assertion is consistent with our earlier analysis discounting the importance of 
covenants not to compete. In that analysis, we considered whether the existence of a covenant 
not to compete between the startup and the engineer could be a factor driving the use of the 
acqui-hire transaction structure. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. We argue here 
that the ability of a buyer to require a talented engineer to execute a covenant not to compete in 
connection with an acqui-hire may play a minor role in encouraging buyers to utilize this 
particular transaction structure. 
 174. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the 
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 700 (1996); see 
also id. (quoting a Silicon Valley attorney as stating that venture financing “is not an adversarial 
process” and that “[p]eople who view it properly . . . realize that they are creating a very long-
term partnership between the venture capitalists on the one hand and the entrepreneurs on the 
other”); cf. Craig W. Johnson, Advising the New Economy: The Role of Lawyers, in THE 
SILICON VALLEY EDGE: A HABITAT FOR INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 325, 334 
(Chong-Moon Lee et al. eds., 2000) (“[I]n environments like Silicon Valley . . . lawyers are 
prized for their ‘win/win’ attitude and an ability to keep everyone focused on common goals and 
make things happen smoothly. Contentiousness, formality, an emphasis on status, and 
unpleasantness are all qualities that will drive clients away.”); Suchman, supra note 105, at 87 
(quoting a California attorney as stating that “I felt like our office in Newport Beach had a sort 
of missionary mode—to at least encourage the entrepreneurs to consider that venture capital 
could be an alternative, because some of the other options are really awful”). 
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antagonistic style where you fight for every nickel on the table.”175 
The acqui-hire, on this account, serves to reinforce prevailing 
community norms by making it possible for the investors to receive 
some return on their investment even if the startup’s founders choose 
to leave and accept lucrative employment at large technology 
companies. 
How are these nonadversarial norms maintained and transmitted 
to new arrivals in the community?176 A study by Professor Mark 
Suchman and Mia Cahill argues that this task is achieved in 
significant part through the efforts of Silicon Valley lawyers.177 In their 
words: 
Silicon Valley lawyers work to “civilize” their clienteles, 
indoctrinating new entrants into the routines and vocabularies of the 
local business community. In a setting where the rapid influx of 
companies and technologies threatens to undermine social 
coherence, law firms help to define and communicate the socially 
constructed boundaries of “reasonable” behavior. . . . [S]uch 
ministrations increase the likelihood that financial transactions will 
reflect the cultural norms of the community rather than the individual 
interests of the client.178 
Specifically, Suchman and Cahill argue that Silicon Valley attorneys 
further nonadversarial community norms by assessing the 
litigiousness of their clients before agreeing to make introductions to 
investors they know,179 advising their clients as to whether certain deal 
 
 175. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 174, at 700 (quoting a Silicon Valley lawyer). 
 176. For a discussion of the ways in which norms are transmitted, see John McMillan & 
Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2421, 2432–35 (2000). 
 177. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 174, at 699–702; see also Broughman, supra note 103, at 
353 (“[E]ven though entrepreneurs may not be repeat players, they are typically represented by 
repeat player law firms that are actively engaged in VC. Such law firms may bolster the 
effectiveness of entrepreneurial business norms.”); Smith, supra note 100, at 154 n.82 (“It is far 
from obvious that the reputational constraints on venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are 
much greater than other potential litigants in American society. Perhaps the relatively modest 
appeal to litigation results from the moderating role of venture capital lawyers.”). 
 178. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 174, at 701 (emphasis added). Suchman and Cahill 
acknowledge that attorneys who adopt this ethos “tread[] near the boundaries of conventional 
legal ethics” and yet argue that “such social regulation may be the price for a viable market.” Id. 
 179. Id. at 698–99. As one lawyer who represents entrepreneurs told Suchman and Cahill,  
[I]f a client comes in, we want to know whether they’re litigious. Frequently, the 
lawyer carries the ball for the client, in terms of opening up connections and 
introducing the client to the business world. We want to make sure that we’re not 
making an introduction that will ultimately backfire on us. 
Id. at 699.  
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terms and valuations are reasonable,180 and encouraging the use of 
certain types of transaction structures.181 In sum, Suchman and Cahill 
argue that Silicon Valley lawyers are “key players in an informal 
apparatus of socialization, coordination, and normalization that 
serves to avert potential disputes between members of the local 
business community.”182 
Although Suchman and Cahill conducted their interviews and 
published their study well before the recent wave of acqui-hires 
began, their claim that Silicon Valley lawyers encourage the use of 
transaction structures that reflect the nonadversarial norms of the 
local community helps to explain the widespread use of the acqui-
hire, a transaction structure whose primary purpose appears to be to 
preserve good relations between investors and entrepreneurs. 
Although none of our interviewees specifically endorsed the 
sociological account offered by Suchman and Cahill, several of the 
interviewed lawyers referenced the unique “culture” of Silicon Valley 
as an important factor in promoting the use of the acqui-hire.183 If 
Suchman and Cahill are correct that community norms support a 
nonadversarial approach toward venture finance, then the widespread 
use of the acqui-hire may also be attributable, at least in part, to these 
norms. 
* * * 
The norms-based account outlined above, we believe, goes a long 
way toward explaining the acqui-hiring puzzle. The threat of various 
nonlegal sanctions serves to deter opportunistic defection on the part 
of the entrepreneurs. At the same time, these entrepreneurs derive 
social status when they sell a company, which encourages the use of 
the acqui-hire transaction structure. These entrepreneurs are, finally, 
steeped in a culture that promotes cooperative, rather than 
adversarial, relationships with investors. These various effects, 
significantly, operate outside the formal legal system, which means 
 
 180. Id. at 700–01. 
 181. Id. at 699–700; cf. id. at 701 (“More generally, Silicon Valley lawyers facilitate smoothly 
functioning capital markets by socializing entrepreneurs in the conventions of the local investor 
community . . . .”). 
 182. Id. at 683. 
 183. E.g., Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm V, supra note 66; Interview with 
Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
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that the story of acqui-hiring is, at least in part, a story about the 
triumph of social norms over legal rules. 
To fully explain the acqui-hiring phenomenon, however, we 
believe it is necessary to supplement this norms-based account with 
two additional points. First, we draw upon prospect theory to suggest 
that the formal structure of acqui-hiring—which diverts funds from 
the engineers before they receive those funds—may reduce the 
perceived cost of acqui-hiring. Second, we argue that tax 
considerations often reduce the actual cost of engaging in an acqui-
hire because they convert ordinary income into capital gains. 
Although neither of these two factors, standing alone, is likely to lead 
engineers to prefer an acqui-hire to a defection, each functions to 
make the acqui-hire more palatable to engineers weighing the costs 
and benefits of engaging in an acqui-hire. 
E. Prospect Theory 
In a defection, all of the buyer’s purchase price goes to the 
engineers in the form of salary, bonuses, restricted stock, and other 
compensation. By contrast, in an acqui-hire, a portion of this 
purchase price paid by the buyer for the engineers’ services is 
effectively diverted from the engineers to the investors and other 
shareholder employees.184 The diverted portion of the buyer’s 
purchase price is not, however, first received by the engineers and 
then paid over by them.185 Instead, the diverted portion goes straight 
from the buyer to the investors and other shareholders. 
Because the diverted portion of the purchase price is never 
actually received by the engineers, the engineers are unlikely to 
mentally code that consideration as ever having “belonged” to them. 
Therefore, they will not perceive those funds as having been lost. 
Prospect theory, a behavioral-economic theory first developed by 
Nobel Prize winners Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,186 suggests 
that, for most people, “[f]oregone gains are less painful than 
perceived losses.”187 Engineers will thus tend to undervalue the costs 
 
 184. See supra Part I.C. 
 185. See supra Part I.C. 
 186. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 
278–88 (2011) (discussing prospect theory). 
 187. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 203; see also 
Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 643 (2003) (“Because 
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that they incur from acqui-hiring, as compared to an equivalent 
transaction in which they first received the buyer’s entire purchase 
price and then paid investors and other shareholders out of their own 
pockets. Thus, the cognitive biases underlying prospect theory 
promote acqui-hiring. 
It is at least theoretically possible that engineers could be able to 
mentally reframe a proposed acqui-hiring transaction to better 
appreciate the associated cost. Legal counsel might, for example, help 
to focus engineers on the fact that foregoing compensation in an 
acqui-hire is economically the same as receiving compensation and 
then paying it over.188 Yet, the engineers in an acqui-hire are often not 
independently represented by counsel.189 Particularly in smaller deals, 
the engineers tend to rely instead on the startup’s company counsel to 
represent their personal interests in the acqui-hire negotiations.190 
Company counsel would not, however, usually be helpful to the 
engineers in assessing the true cost of acqui-hiring because the 
counsel’s client is the start-up company itself, and the startup would 
always prefer an acqui-hire to a defection. A lawyer tasked solely 
with representing the engineers, by contrast, would be under no 
obligation to be loyal to the startup and would, presumably, 
encourage the entrepreneurs to at least consider the possibility of a 
defection. Because of the absence of such an independent lawyer in 
many acqui-hire transactions, the engineers might not be fully aware 
of the defection alternative to the acqui-hire, although one suspects 
that representatives of the buyer might sometimes take it upon 
themselves to raise this possibility. Nevertheless, even if the engineers 
are aware of the defection alternative, the lack of independent 
counsel could make it more difficult for the engineers to mentally 
reframe an acqui-hire transaction to overcome cognitive bias. 
 
people tend to find a loss more painful than a failure to secure an equivalent gain, a frame that 
presents the tax as reducing a gain rather than generating a loss might be expected to make the 
tax more palatable.” (citation omitted)). 
 188. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of 
Interests, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443, 1443 (1994) (suggesting that institutional agents can help the 
principal overcome cognitive biases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of 
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 171–73 (1996) (explaining that litigators can help their clients 
overcome cognitive biases by reframing settlement offers that have been offered to them). 
 189. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38. Although company 
counsel typically recommends that the entrepreneurs obtain their own counsel, this 
recommendation is frequently not followed in smaller deals. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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F. Tax Considerations 
Although prospect theory suggests that the engineer’s perceived 
cost of acqui-hiring will often be lower than the actual cost, tax 
considerations may serve to reduce the actual cost.191 In a defection, 
all of the consideration received by a Silicon Valley engineer via 
signing bonuses or participation in a buyer’s equity-compensation 
plan is generally taxed as compensation income, which has in recent 
history generally been subject to a combined federal and Californian 
maximum effective marginal tax rate of approximately 46 percent.192 
On the other hand, in an acqui-hire, the portion of the deal 
consideration that ultimately flows to the engineer (that is, as 
payment for her stock in the startup) is characterized as capital gains, 
which has in recent history been subject to a combined federal and 
state effective rate of approximately 23 percent.193 Thus, by engaging 
in an acqui-hire and by shifting part of the buyer’s purchase price to 
the deal-consideration pool, the engineer cuts her tax rate 
approximately in half on the amounts that come back to her as 
payment for her equity interest in the startup.194 
 
 191. Several acqui-hire participants confirmed that tax considerations played a role, but only 
after we brought up the subject of taxes. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, 
supra note 44; Interview with Attorneys, Silicon Valley Law Firm I, supra note 38. Only one 
participant spontaneously mentioned tax considerations as a significant factor that promotes 
acqui-hiring. Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. 
 192. See Gerald Prante & Austin John, Top Marginal Effective Rates by State and by 
Source of Income, 2012 Tax Law vs. 2013 Tax Law (as Enacted in ATRA), at 10 tbl.3 (Feb. 3, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2176526 (calculating the 
maximum effective marginal tax rate on wages earned by California residents to be 45.9 percent 
in 2012). In 2013, this rate went up to 51.9 percent due to legislative tax rate increases at both 
the federal and state level. See id. at 3 (explaining that the increase from 2012 to 2013 is 
attributable to the new federal top rate of 39.6 percent and the new California top rate of 13.3 
percent). 
  The discussion in the text uses the tax rates that applied before 2013 because that is the 
period when acqui-hiring first became prominent. Nevertheless, the tax changes that became 
effective in 2013, see American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313, 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9015, 124 Stat. 119, 870 
(2010), continue to provide a significant differential between the tax rates that apply to 
compensation income and those that apply to capital gains, so the overall conclusion that tax 
considerations promote acqui-hiring is not affected, though the precise mathematical 
calculations would be different in 2013. See Prante & John, supra, 5–6 & tbl.1 (calculating a 2013 
top rate of 51.9 percent on wages and 33.0 percent on capital gains for California residents). 
 193. See Prante & John, supra note 192, at 6 tbl. 1 (calculating maximum effective marginal 
tax rate on capital gains earned by California residents to be 23.6 percent in 2012). In 2013, this 
rate went up to 33.0 percent due to legislated tax rate increases. See id. 
 194. Cf. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity 
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 14 (2008) (explaining how private-equity fund managers 
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For example, assume that an engineer could receive $1,000,000 
of compensation income by engaging in a defection. Alternatively, 
the engineer could participate in an acqui-hire, in which case $300,000 
of the buyer’s price that would have gone directly to her is shifted to 
the deal consideration. Assume further that the engineer, in her 
capacity as a shareholder of the startup, has a $100,000 share of the 
$300,000 of deal consideration. 
Under these facts, and assuming a 46 percent tax rate on 
compensation and a 23 percent rate on capital gains, a defection 
would net the engineer approximately $540,000 after taxes.195 In the 
acqui-hire, the engineer would receive a net amount of $455,000.196 
Thus, even though the engineer’s pre-tax cost from engaging in the 
acqui-hire was $200,000,197 the after-tax cost was only $85,000.198 The 
discrepancy is due to the fact that the $200,000 that she left on the 
table would have been taxed at 46 percent, leaving her with only 
$110,000 after tax. She also shifted the character of $100,000 of her 
proceeds from compensation to capital gains, which saved her $23,000 
in taxes.199 
In this example, the tax benefit reduces the after-tax cost to the 
engineer of engaging in the acqui-hire.200 In other cases, it is possible 
 
likewise cut their effective tax rates on compensation approximately in half by receiving their 
incentive compensation as a share of the fund’s profits). As noted above, in 2013 the top 
effective rates increased to 51.9 percent (from 45.9 percent) and 33.0 percent (from 23.6 
percent) on compensation and capital gains, respectively. See supra note 192–193. While both 
rates increased, the capital gains rate increased to a greater extent (both nominally and on a 
percentage basis), which means that the conversion of compensation into capital gains would cut 
the tax rate by approximately one-third (from 51.9 percent to 33.0 percent) instead of 
approximately one-half (from 45.9 percent to 23.6 percent). 
 195. $1,000,000 of compensation less 46 percent of $1,000,000 is $540,000. 
 196. $700,000 of compensation less 46 percent of $700,000, and $100,000 of capital gains less 
23 percent of $100,000, equals $455,000. 
 197. Pre-tax, the engineer received $1,000,000 from the defection and $800,000—that is, 
$700,000 as compensation and $100,000 as payment for her shares—from the acqui-hire. 
 198. Her net after-tax recovery from the defection was $540,000, whereas it was $455,000 
from the acqui-hire. 
 199. At the assumed tax rates, $100,000 of compensation would result in $46,000 in tax 
liability, whereas $100,000 in capital gains would result in $23,000 in tax liability. It is worth 
noting that to calculate the net after-tax cost of an acqui-hire, the acqui-hire would have to be 
compared to a defection and that this comparison would involve a reframing of the transaction 
that might solve the cognitive-bias problem identified in the previous section. Thus, the 
engineers who are most afflicted by cognitive bias are not likely to be motivated by tax 
considerations and vice versa.  
 200. In addition to reducing the after-tax cost to the engineers, it might appear that tax 
considerations promote acqui-hiring by allowing the buyer to inherit the benefits of the start-up 
company’s net operating losses (NOLs). However, preservation of these NOLs is unlikely to be 
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that the acqui-hire could actually result in an after-tax gain to the 
engineer. If the engineer in the example received back $250,000 of 
her compensation deflected to the deal consideration, rather than 
$100,000, then she would end up with after-tax gain of approximately 
$30,000.201 Whether the engineer ends up with an after-tax gain or loss 
depends on how much of the deflected compensation gets returned to 
her as payment for her equity interest in the startup, which depends 
on the investor’s preference rights and the engineer’s percentage 
common-stock interest. 
In any event, at a minimum, tax considerations often reduce the 
actual cost of engaging in an acqui-hire, although they do not affect 
the reputational benefits of doing so. Tax considerations, therefore, 
promote acqui-hiring, subject only to some technical caveats set forth 
in the Appendix. 
IV.  ALLOCATION AND INNOVATION 
In the previous Parts, we identified the existential puzzle 
presented by the acqui-hiring phenomenon and provided our theory 
of acqui-hiring as the solution. In this Part, we address the most 
significant economic issue in acqui-hiring transactions: how the 
aggregate purchase price paid by the buyer is allocated between the 
deal-consideration and the compensation pool. This issue is important 
because it determines how much of the buyer’s purchase price is 
ultimately received by the engineers and how much is received by the 
investors and other employees of the startup. 
 
a significant factor in structuring acqui-hiring transactions. First, the startup’s NOLs will be 
inherited by the buyer only if the acqui-hire is structured as a stock deal or as a tax-free 
reorganization, see BORRIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 95.3 (3d ed. 2003), and acqui-hires are typically not 
structured in those ways, see Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
Second, even if structured as a stock deal or a tax-free reorganization, the start-up company will 
have undergone an ownership change, which triggers substantial limitations on the ability of the 
buyer to utilize these NOLs going forward. See I.R.C. § 382 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (limiting the 
annual use of inherited NOLs following an ownership change of the acquired corporation to the 
product of the acquired corporation’s value on the date of the ownership change and the long-
term tax-exempt rate). These limitations were designed precisely to ensure that acquisitive 
transactions do not occur merely for the purpose of utilizing the target’s NOLs. See BITTKER & 
LOKKEN, supra ¶ 95.5.1 (“Congress sought a limitation that would make NOL carryovers a 
relatively neutral factor in acquisitions.”). 
 201. In the defection scenario, she would end up with $540,000 after tax. See supra note 195 
and accompanying text. In the acqui-hire under the revised facts, she ends up with $570,500 
after tax: $700,000 compensation less 46 percent tax on the $700,000, plus $250,000 of capital 
gains less 23 percent tax on the $250,000, equals $570,500. 
COYLE POLSKY IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  4:06 PM 
332 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:281 
A. Allocation of Consideration 
The critical economic issue in an acqui-hire is the allocation of 
the buyer’s purchase price between the deal-consideration pool and 
the compensation pool. In a bona fide acquisition, the amount of deal 
consideration would equal the value of the startup’s assets (less any 
liabilities assumed by the buyer). But in an acqui-hire, by definition, 
the assets of the startup other than the talented workforce have 
relatively little, if any, value to the buyer.202 Thus, the main function of 
the deal consideration paid to the company is simply to pay off the 
investors so the entrepreneurs can obtain the reputational benefits 
described in Part III. Because the deal consideration mostly buys 
these intangible benefits instead of actual assets, pricing is a difficult 
exercise. Furthermore, the fact that the engineers could simply defect 
without risk of legal sanction makes negotiations over allocations 
unique.203 After all, if the investors push too hard, the engineers could 
conclude that the reputational benefits from an acqui-hire are no 
longer worth the cost. 
In essence, the question is the size of the investors’ “acqui-hiring 
premium”—the amount that they are paid above and beyond their 
share of whatever valuable assets the startup owns at the time of the 
acqui-hire. To preserve the reputation of the engineers, and to get the 
cooperation necessary to achieve the desired optics of an acquisition, 
the investors need to get paid an acqui-hiring premium amount close 
to the amount to which the investors believe they are entitled. But 
how much of an acqui-hiring premium should investors believe they 
are entitled? The situation is analogous to tipping of service 
providers. Social norms tell us that certain service providers should be 
tipped—even though tippers are not legally responsible for leaving a 
tip—and that the amount of the tip is calculated based on what 
service providers expect to get tipped.204 Absent knowledge of the 
“typical” tip, however, how does one know when one has been left a 
tip that is exceedingly generous or insultingly low or just right? 
Theoretical arguments about the investor’s “proper” recovery do 
not help resolve the issue. On the one hand, the startup has no legally 
 
 202. See supra Part I.C. 
 203. See supra Part II.A. 
 204. See Yoram Margalioth, The Case Against Tipping, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 117, 118 
(2006) (“People typically tip fifteen to twenty percent of the bill (or double the sales tax plus 
change in places where the sales tax is around seven to eight percent), as long as the service is 
reasonable.”). 
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cognizable claim to the future at-will employment of the engineers, 
and therefore the investors are entitled to little or no acqui-hiring 
premium. On the other hand, without the investors’ cash investment, 
the team of engineers would not have been built and that team would 
not have had the opportunity to showcase their abilities to the buyer. 
Under this view, the investors should receive a not-insignificant 
acqui-hiring premium. Both sides have good fairness arguments, and 
there is no real guidance about how to resolve the conflict. 
Two problems stem from the current state of ambiguity. First, it 
would seem to make negotiations over allocations unduly expensive 
and time consuming. Second, by increasing the variance of possible 
outcomes, the ambiguity exposes the parties to additional, unwanted 
risk. One possible response to these inefficiencies would be the 
development of a rule of thumb, like the 15- to 20-percent norm for 
tipping in restaurants.205 If a standard norm were to develop in the 
acqui-hiring context, the buyer and the engineers would have a much 
better sense for how much of an acqui-hiring premium that they 
would need to pay to the investors, thereby reducing their negotiating 
costs and risk.206 Because of the increased efficiency, we predict that 
such a norm will eventually develop in acqui-hiring. 
Nevertheless, a rule of thumb does not appear to exist currently, 
or if it does exist, it is not yet very salient. Acqui-hiring participants 
with whom we spoke were emphatic that the negotiating dynamics of 
acqui-hire transactions were impossible to generalize and that pricing 
was always determined on a case-by-case basis.207 When we 
specifically asked about a rule of thumb, they universally denied that 
one existed. 
Although participants initially declined to make generalizations 
about pricing, when pushed a number agreed that in several acqui-
hires they had seen, the investors expected to get back their 
investment.208 This evidence suggests that a norm of investors getting 
their money back in acqui-hires might eventually develop. Under this 
norm, the allocation between the deal-consideration and the 
compensation pool would be reverse engineered to ensure that the 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. See generally William J. Baumol & Richard E. Quandt, Rules of Thumb and Optimally 
Imperfect Decisions, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 23 (1964) (discussing the efficiency of rules of thumb 
and the design of effective rules of thumb in the pricing context). 
 207. E.g., Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm II, supra note 44. 
 208. Id.; Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. 
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investors got roughly their money back. An alternative would be for a 
norm to develop regarding the percentage of the buyer’s overall 
purchase price that should be allocated to the deal-consideration 
pool. For example, the norm could be that 20 percent of the buyer’s 
aggregate purchase price should be allocated to the deal-
consideration pool. 
We believe that, should a rule of thumb develop, it will be the 
money-back-for-the-investors norm, for four reasons. First, in our 
discussions with acqui-hire participants, it seemed natural for them to 
use the amount of the investor’s investment as the key point of 
reference. Conversely, interviewees rarely talked about the relative 
consideration between the two pools, and usually only after being 
specifically prompted to discuss that ratio. Several interviewees 
mentioned, for example, that they had firsthand knowledge of a deal 
in which the investor “got his money back” or “got a substantial 
fraction of his money back” or “negotiated to get back double his 
initial investment.”209 However, interviewees did not refer to 
percentages of total consideration. This suggests that acqui-hire 
participants tend to think of the investor’s “rightful” share of acqui-
hiring proceeds by reference to the amount of the investor’s 
investment. 
Second, there would be significant practical problems in 
implementing a percentage-allocation norm. Because the startup and 
its investors do not participate in the compensation pool, they are not 
necessarily privy to the amount in this pool and its particulars.210 Our 
interviewees disagreed about whether investors typically knew the 
terms of the compensation pool.211 But even if some investors are 
aware of the size of the compensation pool, valuation of that pool for 
purposes of making a percentage allocation would be difficult.212 As 
 
 209. See supra note 208. 
 210. However, they do participate in the deal-consideration pool. In an asset deal, the 
startup receives the deal consideration, which is subsequently distributed to the investors in 
liquidation. In a stock deal, the investors directly receive their share of the deal consideration. 
 211. Compare Interview with Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. I, supra note 38 (noting 
that investors generally know the precise terms of compensation pool), and Interview with 
Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38 (noting that investors know the terms of 
compensation pool as a result of disclosures in the approval process), with Interview with 
Acqui-hired Emp., NASDAQ 100 Co. II, supra note 61 (noting that investors do not know the 
terms of compensation pool). 
 212. The deal consideration is usually fully vested, so there is no issue in valuing that pool. 
But, with regard to unvested property, some of the value of the property is surely attributable to 
the future effort of the defecting engineers that is necessary to cause the property to vest. Cf. 
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discussed above, the compensation pool consists mostly of equity 
compensation that vests over time.213 A percentage-allocation norm 
would require discounting unvested consideration to take into 
account the risk of nonvesting and also the fact that the engineers 
effectively earn some of that consideration through their future work 
effort, to which the investors have no reasonable claim.214 
Furthermore, even if the valuation issue were not overly difficult, 
there would be nothing to stop the buyer and the engineers from 
supplementing the compensation pool with grants of incentive 
compensation that are awarded shortly after the acqui-hire deal 
closed. 
Third, considering that one of the primary purposes of the deal 
consideration is to “do right” by the investors,215 using the investors’ 
initial investment as the point of reference leads to more rational and 
predictable results. If a percentage-allocation rule were used, the 
amount that the investor ultimately recovers would depend on 
matters like liquidation preferences and percentage stock ownership, 
which can vary substantially from deal to deal. Yet the vast majority 
of acqui-hires involve the same basic fact pattern: the startup was not 
successful, though a promising team of engineers was assembled.216 If 
a percentage-allocation rule were used, investors in different acqui-
hires could receive drastically different returns on investment, even 
though all of their investments suffered the same fate. 
Finally, behavioral-economic research indicates that people tend 
to have a particularly intense focus on the amount of their sunk-cost 
investments in making financial decisions, even if the sunk costs are 
not at all relevant to the decision at hand.217 In other words, people 
will make efforts to avoid “booking” a loss. Thus, for example, in 
evaluating the price at which they would be willing to sell their 
homes, people appear to place a significant amount of weight on how 
 
Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm V, supra note 66. That value is effectively 
additional compensation and should not be considered part of the overall consideration that 
would be divided according to a rule-of-thumb percentage allocation. 
 213. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 214. For a discussion of pro rata allocations of each type of consideration paid by the buyer, 
see supra Part I.C.  
 215. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 217. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 47–50 (1980) (modeling the sunk-cost effect). See generally Hal R. Arkes & 
Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985) (discussing this effect). 
COYLE POLSKY IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  4:06 PM 
336 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:281 
much they paid for the home.218 This phenomenon, known as the 
sunk-cost or break-even effect, suggests that in acqui-hiring 
situations, in which the “proper” allocation to the deal-consideration 
pool is highly uncertain, investors will tend to focus on the amount of 
their initial investment in evaluating the fairness of an acqui-hire 
deal.219 
In summary, we predict that a money-back-for-the-investors 
norm will develop, which will help determine the ultimate allocation 
between the deal-consideration and compensation pools. Although 
this norm will be a starting point for negotiating the allocation, many 
of the factors discussed in Part III will influence the final allocation.220 
For example, all else being equal, particularly prominent VCs will 
likely receive greater allocations to the deal-consideration pool 
(because of reputational concerns), as will investors who have had 
more significant face-to-face contact with their entrepreneurs 
(because of loyalty effects). 
 
 218. See Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1110 n.257 (2008) 
(“Turning down offers below the purchase-price benchmark may be understood as risk-seeking 
behavior consistent with the ‘trying to break even’ phenomenon.” (quoting Richard H. Thaler 
& Eric J. Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and Trying To Break Even: The Effects of 
Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 643, 657–58 (1990))); David Genesove & 
Christopher Mayer, Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market, 116 
Q.J. ECON. 1233, 1238 (2001) (suggesting that individuals facing the prospect of selling their 
home for less than they paid for it chose higher asking prices and held out for longer before 
selling); Thaler & Johnson, supra, at 644 (discussing the break-even effect and suggesting that 
“when decision makers have prior losses, outcomes which offer the opportunity to ‘break even’ 
are especially attractive”). 
 219. For a discussion of this phenomenon in other contexts, see supra note 217. It should be 
noted that the behavioral-economic research behind these theories involves the general 
population, not start-up investors. There is reason to suspect that start-up investors might not 
evaluate financial matters in the same way that the general population does. Start-up investors 
are willing to finance large numbers of failures for the chance at a home-run investment. See 
supra Part III.B.; see also Fred Wilson, When Things Don’t Work Out, AVC (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2013/03/when-things-dont-work-out.html (“[E]arly stage VC is a lot 
like baseball, if you get a hit one out of every three times, you are headed to the hall of fame.”). 
They therefore may not mentally frame financial matters in the same way as ordinary people, 
who do not make such risky investments. 
 220. The salience of this norm will vary depending on the amount of money invested in the 
startup by the investors in the first instance. If the investors have put $100,000 into the business, 
then a money-back norm is probably viable. If the investors have invested $10 million into the 
business, then it is probably not. 
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B. Legal Innovation To Protect Investor Interests 
We previously discussed why it is difficult for investors in Silicon 
Valley to make credible threats to sue their entrepreneurs.221 As a 
consequence, investors generally lack leverage to protect their 
interests in acqui-hire transactions.222 Prominent entrepreneur and 
tech blogger Michael Arrington suggests that, in response to this 
situation, counsel for investors will develop legal innovations to 
address this deficiency. Specifically, he suggests that investors’ 
counsel develop new contractual provisions that deal specifically with 
the prospect of a future acqui-hire.223 In this Section, we discuss 
several possible innovations along these lines.224 
First, investors could try to increase the liquidation preference 
they receive on their preferred stock or the liquidation premium they 
receive on their convertible notes. Liquidation preferences or 
premiums typically stipulate that upon the occurrence of a liquidity 
event—such as the sale or liquidation of the company—the investors 
will receive back their initial investment or a multiple thereof, as well 
as any accrued-yet-unpaid dividends or interest. In response to the 
acqui-hire phenomenon, investors could negotiate for a liquidation 
preference or premium with a higher multiple. In theory, this would 
increase the investor’s recovery in an acqui-hire because it would 
increase the investor’s share of the deal-consideration pool. However, 
a significant problem with this approach is that it does not ensure that 
a minimum amount of consideration will even flow into the deal-
consideration pool. If there are insufficient funds to pay the investor 
 
 221. See supra Part II.B. 
 222. Interview with Corp. Dev. Officer, NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 143 (“If . . . all 
the . . . employees want out, then the investors don’t have much leverage.”). 
 223. See Arrington, supra note 5 (“[W]hat I do believe we’ll start to see are clauses being 
added to investment contracts that are designed to change these [acqui-hire] deals. Specifically 
these clauses would force all deal consideration around a deal—including stock options and 
stock grants to employees—to be pooled and distributed pro rata among all shareholders.”). 
 224. The most obvious and straightforward contractual innovation that would increase the 
leverage of the investors in an acqui-hire transaction would be to require, as a condition to get 
funding, all start-up employees to sign enforceable covenants not to compete that would cover 
employment with the technology companies that engage in acqui-hiring. This would require the 
buyer and defecting engineers to negotiate with the investors for a release and would, 
consequently, give the investors the bargaining leverage that they currently lack. The problem, 
of course, is that California refuses to enforce covenants not to compete as a matter of public 
policy save in a few limited instances not relevant here. This innovation would therefore be 
ineffective in Silicon Valley. 
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its full preference or premium, then the investor bears the shortfall.225 
Put differently, the key economic issue in acqui-hires is not the 
amount of liquidation preference or premium but, rather, the 
allocation of the buyer’s payments between the deal-consideration 
and the compensation pools. 
In addition, an overly generous liquidation preference could 
actually backfire by encouraging the engineers to simply defect to the 
buyer in lieu of doing an acqui-hire. As discussed above, there are a 
number of reasons why these individuals would be reluctant to defect, 
including concern for their reputation, a sense of loyalty to their 
investors, fear of social sanctions, the positive optics of being acquired 
by a larger company, and tax considerations.226 If the liquidation 
preference eats too much into the engineers’ ultimate take-home 
recovery, the magnitude of these factors may be less than the 
marginal cost of doing an acqui-hire, which would cause the engineers 
to defect.227 In that case, the investors would receive little or no 
recovery when the startup thereafter liquidates. 
Alternatively, investment contracts could specify that all of the 
consideration, whether in the deal-consideration or compensation 
pool, go into the deal-consideration pool for distribution pursuant to 
the waterfall-distribution rules (for example, first to creditors, then to 
preferred stockholders, then to common stockholders).228 The 
problem with this approach is that, as previously mentioned, the 
compensation pool typically consists of restricted stock and other 
unvested consideration that must, from the buyer’s perspective, go to 
the engineers for incentive purposes.229 To throw everything into the 
deal-consideration pool would usually result in much of this incentive 
compensation ending up in the investor’s hands, which would make 
the transaction undesirable to the buyer. Furthermore, as with an 
 
 225. Another problem with this approach is that it could change the economics in 
transactions that are true acquisitions, not acqui-hires.  
 226. See supra Part III. 
 227. One interviewee told us that he had been involved in an acqui-hire transaction in which 
an angel investor had negotiated a fivefold liquidation preference. Interview with Corp. Dev. 
Officer, NASDAQ 100 Co., supra note 143. This preference, if honored, would have ensured 
that the investor received the entirety of the deal consideration. The buyer informed the 
investor that it would not do the deal unless he waived his preference and accepted a smaller 
payout. The investor eventually agreed to accept a smaller payout, in part because the startup 
was teetering on the brink of insolvency and there was a real prospect that he would receive 
nothing if the deal did not occur. 
 228. Cf. supra note 58. 
 229. Interview with Attorney, AmLaw 100 Law Firm I, supra note 38. 
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overly generous liquidation preference or premium, if the engineers 
determine that they would get too little under the waterfall after 
pooling all of the buyer’s consideration together, they could simply 
defect, leaving the investor with little or nothing. 
The most promising potential innovation would be for 
investment contracts to specify, instead, that a minimum percentage 
amount of the buyer’s aggregate payments be allocated to the deal-
consideration pool. For example, 30 percent of the buyer’s total 
consideration would have to be allocated to the deal-consideration 
pool. Although more promising than the innovations previously 
discussed, this approach also has its problems. 
First, there is the issue of valuation. The compensation pool paid 
by the buyer will typically not be paid out all at once but, rather, will 
consist of restricted stock and other inducements that vest over time 
and, in some cases, are performance based.230 It will therefore be 
difficult to determine the present value of the aggregate consideration 
paid by the buyer, which is a necessary first step in determining what 
percentage of this consideration must be allocated to the deal-
consideration pool. One way to solve this valuation problem would be 
to make the allocations to each pool consist of pro rata portions of 
each type of consideration. So, if the required allocation is 30/70, then 
30 percent of the restricted stock and other incentive compensation 
would go into the deal consideration, as would 30 percent of any cash 
or unrestricted stock paid by the buyer. But this is deeply problematic 
from the perspective of the buyer, who wants the incentive 
compensation to go to its newly hired engineers to get the desired 
incentive effects. Furthermore, the investors would generally prefer 
not to have their economic fortunes depend on whether their former 
employees continued their employment with the buyer for the full 
three or four years or whether they went on to hit their performance 
incentives.231 
Closely related to the valuation problem is the fact that, when 
equity compensation vests over time, part of the economic value 
going to the recipient engineer is attributable to her work effort after 
the acqui-hire closes. In that sense, restricted stock is akin to future 
salary. Presumably, in valuing unvested compensation for purposes of 
making the minimum allocation to the deal consideration, the 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Interview with Attorney, Silicon Valley Law Firm II, supra note 38. 
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compensation must be discounted to reflect the fact that future work 
effort by the engineers will be necessary to receive it. 
Another problem with this approach is that there are relatively 
easy ways for the buyer and the engineers to circumvent it. Although 
unvested compensation will presumably be included in the calculation 
of the buyer’s aggregate consideration, future salary earned by the 
engineers presumably will not. Buyers and engineers could therefore 
swap unvested equity compensation for greater salary and thereby 
reduce the investor’s recovery. Even though this strategy would not 
be optimal for the buyer and the engineers—who, all else being equal, 
would have structured for unvested equity compensation rather than 
salary—the benefit of cutting the investors out may be enough to 
justify the cost. Similarly, new incentive packages granted by the 
buyer after the acqui-hire would presumably not be included in the 
total consideration paid by the buyer, though there would probably 
be a representation at closing that there are no side deals. Buyers and 
the engineers could have an informal understanding, one that is not 
legally enforceable, that the buyers will review the engineers’ 
incentive packages six months after closing to determine whether 
they are properly incentivized. Though not ideal from the engineers’ 
perspective, due to the added uncertainty, the benefit of not having to 
share the newly granted incentive compensation might be worth the 
risk.232 
Finally, as with the other potential innovations, if the engineers 
determine that the investors’ share is too large, they could simply 
defect. A minimum-percentage-allocation rule could try to cover 
defections, though it would not be easy to distinguish between 
defections that are in lieu of acqui-hires (which would trigger the 
rule) and garden variety departures (which would not). But even if a 
defection were covered, to make a recovery investors would 
ultimately have to, at a minimum, credibly threaten that they would 
enforce their contractual rights in court. Given the received wisdom 
 
 232. Another problem with this approach is the definitional issue of whether a defection 
would trigger the minimum-percentage-allocation rule. If the transaction is structured as an 
acqui-hire, then it is clear that the rule would apply. But what if there is simply a defection? In 
that case, there is formally no deal-consideration pool. If defections did not trigger the 
minimum-percentage-allocation rule, then that would again create an incentive at the margin to 
defect rather than do an acqui-hire. And if certain defections did trigger the rule, then the 
contractual provision would have to distinguish between the ones that do and the ones that do 
not. If the entire group of founders and engineers left in one fell swoop, that would be an easy 
case. But what if only one of the founders and three engineers left? 
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in Silicon Valley that investors never sue their founders, and the 
dearth of any such litigation, it is likely that any such threat would be 
perceived as empty. 
In summary, it is doubtful that legal innovations could, standing 
alone, adequately protect investors in acqui-hire situations. When 
combined with the factors discussed in Part III, however, legal 
innovations could serve to increase the investor’s recovery. If, for 
example, the documents specify the amount that investors are to 
receive, reputational and loyalty effects may encourage the engineers 
to pay out the specified amount or an amount reasonably close to it. 
The ever-present danger, however, is that if investors push too hard, 
whether in the legal documents or in negotiations, the engineers will 
simply defect, leaving the investors empty handed. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we provided the first formal description of the 
acqui-hire transaction structure. We also proposed a solution to the 
existential puzzle of acqui-hiring. Drawing upon state law, social 
norms, informal sanctions, tax considerations, and cognitive biases, 
we showed how the social norms of Silicon Valley lead engineers in 
some cases to prefer acqui-hires over defections, even though acqui-
hires leave money on the table. Finally, we analyzed the critical issue 
of how acqui-hiring proceeds are allocated between investors and 
entrepreneurs and discussed several contractual innovations that have 
the potential to better protect investors in acqui-hire situations. 
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APPENDIX 
In Part III.F, we explained that tax considerations promote 
acqui-hiring by converting ordinary income into capital gains. A few 
technical caveats to the tax analysis are necessary, though they do not 
alter the conclusion that tax considerations generally support acqui-
hiring. 
First, acqui-hires are sometimes structured as tax-free 
reorganizations.233 In those situations—which are not common234—the 
tax benefit to the engineers from receiving a portion of the deal 
consideration in lieu of compensation is even greater. This is because, 
in addition to the favorable conversion of ordinary income into 
capital gain, the employees also get to defer the capital-gains tax until 
they liquidate the buyer stock that they receive in the 
reorganization.235 
Second, in analyzing the tax advantageousness of a particular 
transaction structure, the tax consequences to all parties to the 
transaction must be considered.236 If one side of a transaction receives 
a tax benefit and the other side receives an equal, offsetting tax 
detriment, the transaction is not tax advantaged, and we would expect 
the parties to take these offsetting tax consequences into account in 
setting their nominal (that is, pre-tax) prices.237 Therefore, it is not a 
complete analysis to simply say that the engineers are better off tax-
wise receiving a certain amount of deal consideration in lieu of the 
same amount from the compensation pool, because the buyer may 
 
 233. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
 234. See supra note 199. 
 235. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 356(a)(1) (2006) (providing for nonrecognition of gain when 
stock is exchanged in a reorganization). 
 236. See Michael S. Knoll, The Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, 103 TAX 
NOTES 203, 208 (2004) (“Whether a compensation mechanism is tax efficient or not should be 
determined from a joint contracting perspective rather than the employer’s or employee’s 
perspective alone.”); David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 695, 699–700 (2004) (focusing attention upon the tax consequences for employers and 
employees). 
 237. See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 561–62 (3d ed. 2011) 
(“[T]he side of the market on which the tax is imposed is irrelevant to the distribution of the tax 
burdens.”); Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 
85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 580 (2007) (noting that the “side of the compensation arrangement on 
which a tax burden is imposed or a tax benefit is conferred is irrelevant . . . since the parties can 
adjust the nominal pretax compensation to shift the tax benefits and burdens between 
themselves”). 
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suffer a tax detriment when it pays more deal-consideration and less 
into the compensation pool.238 
However, in most acqui-hire cases, the buyer will not suffer a 
significant tax detriment. If the buyer, in lieu of an acqui-hire, had 
simply hired away the engineers, the buyer would have generally 
received immediate, ordinary deductions when it made compensation 
payments to the engineers.239 If the acqui-hire is structured as the 
buyer’s purchase of a covenant not to sue, then that payment would 
also result in an ordinary deduction.240 Thus, there would be no tax 
detriment to the buyer. 
However, if the acqui-hire is structured as an asset deal or stock 
purchase, then the buyer’s deductions would be deferred. If the buyer 
purchases the startup’s assets, the purchase price of those assets 
would generally be amortized ratably over fifteen years,241 and those 
amortization deductions would be characterized as ordinary 
deductions. However, if all of the startup’s intangible assets, including 
workplace in force, were abandoned or became worthless before the 
end of that fifteen-year period, then the unamortized cost of those 
assets could be immediately deducted at that time.242 Finally, if the 
acqui-hire is structured as a stock purchase, the buyer would not be 
entitled to any immediate deduction, but it would be entitled to an 
ordinary deduction once the stock was abandoned or deemed to be 
worthless.243 Thus, in cases in which the acqui-hire is structured as an 
asset or stock deal, the buyer’s deduction will be delayed somewhat, 
 
 238. See Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 7, at 1088 (arguing that a unilateral tax perspective is 
flawed). 
 239. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (authorizing deduction for compensation). 
This is generally true regardless of the form in which the compensation is paid. If the 
compensation is paid in the form of stock options or restricted stock, then the ordinary 
deduction would often be delayed until the options are exercised or the restricted stock vests. 
See id. § 83(h) (2006) (“Such deduction shall be allowed for the taxable year of such person in 
which or with which ends the taxable year in which such amount is included in the gross income 
of the person who performed such services.”).  
 240. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (2013) (allowing immediate deductions when intangible 
value is acquired except in certain specified instances not relevant to the purchase of a covenant 
not to sue). 
 241. See I.R.C. § 197 (2006) (providing that business intangibles are generally amortized 
ratably over fifteen years).  
 242. Id. § 165(a). But see id. § 197(f)(1)(A) (disallowing the loss deduction if the taxpayer 
retains any § 197 intangibles).  
 243. See id. § 165 (authorizing a deduction for losses incurred in a trade or business). Even if 
the acqui-hire is structured as a stock deal, then the buyer would still be entitled to an ordinary 
deduction once the startup’s stock is abandoned or deemed worthless. Id. § 165(g). 
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which is generally disadvantageous. However, this tax cost is likely 
not significant for two reasons. First, because the startup’s projects 
can be expected to be jettisoned quickly after the acqui-hire is 
completed, the buyer will typically not have to wait very long to get 
all of its deductions.244 Second, many of the buyers in acqui-hire 
transactions are subject to low effective marginal tax rates—because 
of the existence of net operating losses245 or due to international tax 
planning relating to intangibles.246 These low tax rates mean that 
whatever delay occurs with respect to deduction utilization would 
often result in a low tax cost to the buyer. 
However, if an acqui-hire is accomplished via a tax-free 
reorganization, then the acqui-hire could be significantly detrimental 
tax-wise to the buyer. In a tax-free reorganization, the buyer will 
generally receive a carryover basis in the startup’s assets (in an asset 
deal) or in the employee’s stock (in a stock deal).247 In either case, that 
basis will usually be very low and, when the stock or assets are 
thereafter jettisoned or deemed worthless, the buyer’s loss will be 
limited to the amount of that basis;248 on the other hand, in a 
poach/defection, the buyer would typically get a deduction equal to 
the full value of the consideration paid by the buyer.249 
In summary, the buyer will generally not suffer significant 
adverse tax consequences from the acqui-hire structure, except 
perhaps if the transaction is structured as a tax-free reorganization, 
 
 244. It is possible that the buyer might not be able to recover the entire purchase price until 
all of the acqui-hired engineers depart. See Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(3) (defining “workforce in 
place,” which is an intangible subject to the amortization rules in § 197, as including “any 
portion of the purchase price of an acquired trade or business attributable to the existence of a 
highly-skilled workforce”). On the other hand, the expected employment term for an acqui-
hired engineer is likely relatively short compared to the full fifteen-year amortization period. 
 245. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Facebook’s Zuckerberg May Face $2 Billion Tax Bill, 
CNNMONEY (Feb. 7, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/07/technology/zuckerberg_
tax_bill/index.htm (noting that Facebook expects to realize a net operating loss in 2012). 
 246. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax 
Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html (noting 
Google’s 2.4 percent effective tax rate); see also Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. 
TAX REV. 699, 707–13 (2011) (describing in detail Google’s use of the “Double Irish Dutch 
Sandwich” structure that results in Google’s exceptionally low effective tax rate). 
 247. I.R.C. § 362(b).  
 248. See id. § 165(b) (limiting loss deductions to the amount of basis in the property that 
suffers the loss). 
 249. See id. § 162 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (allowing a deduction for reasonable compensation 
paid in connection with a trade or business). 
COYLE POLSKY IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  4:06 PM 
2013] ACQUI-HIRING 345 
which is unusual.250 However, even in tax-free reorganizations, if the 
buyer is subject to very low effective marginal tax rates, the tax cost 
will be minimal. 
Third, and finally, the tax discussion in Part III.F assumes that 
the parties’ characterization of the acqui-hire transaction will be 
respected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Yet, the form of an 
acqui-hire does not truly reflect its substance. When a buyer in an 
acqui-hire pays for a covenant not to sue, it really is not worried 
about getting sued.251 Likewise, when the buyer purchases the assets 
or stock of the startup, it actually does not place significant value on 
these items.252 In substance, the deal consideration in acqui-hires is 
additional compensation paid to the engineers who pay it over to 
investors and other shareholders for the purpose of preserving their 
reputation.253 The IRS is able to recharacterize transactions when the 
form of the transaction is inconsistent with its substance.254 In an 
acqui-hire situation, that would mean treating the engineers as first 
receiving the entire purchase price (that is, the aggregate of the deal-
consideration and the compensation pool) and then transferring the 
appropriate portion of it over to the investors and others. In the 
example in Part III.F, when the engineer deflected $300,000 of her 
would-be $1,000,000 compensation into the deal-consideration pool 
and received back $100,000 in respect of her equity interest in the 
startup, the IRS would treat the engineer as first receiving the full 
$1,000,000 as compensation and then transferring $200,000 to the 
investors. The full $1,000,000 would be ordinary compensation 
income and the employee would likely be able to claim a $200,000 
ordinary deduction255 for net ordinary income of $800,000.256 If the 
 
 250. See supra note 199. 
 251. Part II concluded that acqui-hires are not explained by litigation risk. 
 252. For a description of acqui-hires as transactions that buyers undertake merely to hire the 
startup’s at-will employees, see supra Part I. 
 253. For the argument that reputation enhancement is the best explanation for the acqui-
hiring phenomenon, see supra Part III.A–C. 
 254. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921) (recognizing “the importance of 
regarding matters of substance and disregarding forms in applying the . . . income tax laws”); 
Estate of Weinert v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961) (referring to 
the substance-over-form principle as “the cornerstone of sound taxation”). 
 255. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (allowing a deduction for ordinary and 
necessary business expenses). Historically, courts have sometimes disallowed deductions for 
when an individual makes voluntary reputation-enhancing payments, even when they are 
intended to bolster the individual’s future earning capacity. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 
U.S. 111, 112, 115–16 (1933) (denying such a deduction). But see Jenkins v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 238, 247 (1983) (allowing such a deduction based on the specific facts and circumstances 
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acqui-hire were respected, she would have realized $700,000 of 
ordinary income and $100,000 of capital gain. Thus, the recast by the 
IRS would take away the tax benefit that the engineer received by 
effectively recharacterizing $100,000 of capital gain as ordinary 
income. Whether the IRS would be able to make this type of 
recharacterization in acqui-hire transactions depends on whether the 
IRS would be able to distinguish a bona fide acquisition, in which the 
buyer really wants the items it buys, from a mere acqui-hire, in which 
the buyer really only wants the at-will human capital. 
 
 
of the case). However, recently promulgated regulations appear to overrule the Welch case and 
allow a deduction for reputation-enhancing expenditures that are related to the taxpayer’s trade 
or business in all cases. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (2013). However, for the acqui-hired 
engineer, the deduction would be considered an unreimbursed employee business expense, 
I.R.C. § 62(a)(1), amended by American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 
§ 201, 126 Stat. 2313, 2323, and therefore it would be subject to limitation under § 67, see id. 
§§ 67(a), (b) (2006), and under the alternative minimum tax, see id. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011). 
 256. As discussed in the preceding footnote, the deduction would be limited under § 67 and 
the alternative minimum tax, so the net ordinary income would effectively be higher than 
$800,000 and, depending on the taxpayer’s adjusted gross-income level and other deductions, 
could approach $1,000,000. 
